

# Territorial Indivisibility and Public Preference for Dispute Resolution: Evidence from Japan \*

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## Abstract

Why do countries continue to make sovereignty claims over territories that they have lost for a long time, and are in no position to take back by force? Moreover, why do they refuse compromised solutions that are better than the status quo? We argue that a belief in territorial indivisibility may explain these behaviors. We conduct a survey experiment in Japan to test two main hypotheses derived from the argument. We first investigate whether historical ownership gives rise to a belief in territorial indivisibility among respondents, and second, whether such a belief contributes to more hardline policy positions toward territorial disputes. We find that indeed historical ownership plays a significant role in the respondents' perceptions of territorial indivisibility compared with the alternative scenario of no such ownership. Furthermore, those who perceive a territory to be indivisible are more likely to favor economic sanctions and military actions toward a dispute, and much less likely to support bilateral negotiation.

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There are many unresolved territorial disputes in the world today that have existed for a long time. For instance, the Falklands/Malvinas dispute started in 1833 when Britain took control of the islands from Spanish hands; Argentina protested the occupation immediately, claiming its sovereignty over the islands as Spain's successor. The territory has since been under the British control for nearly two centuries, but Argentina has consistently asserted its claim over the islands. Moreover, despite having no feasible military solution to the dispute (including a failed attempt to gain control of the islands by force in 1982), Argentina has refused to accept any bilateral bargaining solution short of full Argentine sovereignty (Laver 2001).

This phenomenon of a country neither giving up a territorial claim, nor settling for a compromise in the face of a total military defeat is not unique to the Falklands/Malvinas dispute. Another well known case in South America is Bolivia's continued claim to a sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean that it lost to Chile in 1879. Bolivia has no realistic chance to win back its coast through military means, but it has consistently refused any compromise solution offered by Chile. In East Asia, China, Japan, and South Korea have all made total claims over the disputed territories with each other, and there has been no sign of compromise for over half a century. These disputes have not been in serious danger of escalation for some time, but the potential exists, as in the case of Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. In the meantime, other long running territorial disputes where both parties make all-or-nothing claims, such as those over Jerusalem and Kashmir, have repeatedly fallen into violence and war.

Why do countries make all-or-nothing sovereignty claims over territories that they lost a long time ago, and moreover, refuse any compromise solutions that will give them *something*, as opposed to nothing at all under the status quo? And why do countries refuse to back down from all-or-nothing positions over disputed territories in spite of enormous costs incurred from continuing conflict? These behaviors are puzzling, particularly in light of bargaining theory of war.

In his seminal work on causes of war, Fearon (1995) identifies issue indivisibility as one of the three reasons that may lead to bargaining failure and war. However, he also points out that the empirical significance of issue indivisibility is limited because side payments

or certain allocation mechanisms would allow compromise solutions to exist even for such issues. Many scholars have come to share the view and see issue indivisibility primarily as a bargaining strategy of states (Frieden, Lake, and Schultz 2012, 115-117, Kydd 2015, Powell 2006, Wiegand 2011, Henripin 2016). On the other hand, Powell (2006) argues that issue indivisibility is fundamentally a commitment problem: In principle, actors can find a lottery to determine the allocation of such a good, but they may not be able to commit to honoring such an agreement *ex post*. Together, these arguments suggest that issue indivisibility by itself is not a compelling explanation for bargaining failure and war; it is a reflection of some other dynamics at work in domestic and international politics.

These theories may very well be correct in that issue indivisibility cannot explain many or most bargaining failures. But we also cannot rule out the possibility that the problem lies at the heart of many intractable territorial disputes, such as those discussed earlier. The long histories of these disputes, as well as the consistency in the countries' uncompromising stances, beg further investigations of the role of issue indivisibility in such conflicts. We take up the task in this study and investigate the puzzle of all-or-nothing phenomenon observed in territorial disputes.

Using a survey experiment conducted in Japan, we go beyond the existing studies in two important ways to investigate the puzzle: We relax the assumption that states are unitary actors by investigating domestic public's preferences, and we examine how these preferences are influenced by individuals' *beliefs* over disputed territories. In doing so, we open the black box of domestic politics in the bargaining framework, and draw attention to domestic preferences that can lead to bargaining failure through the mechanism of issue indivisibility.

Specifically, we randomly assign to our respondents different hypothetical dispute scenarios, varying in three dimensions: historical ownership of the territory, military strength of the opponent, and economic value of the territory. We then ask them two related questions. First, we ask them to indicate whether a range of divisible and indivisible outcomes of the dispute acceptable or not. This question allows us to uncover whether some respondents hold a belief in territorial indivisibility, and moreover, whether the three dimensions of the territory contribute to such a belief. Second, we ask them whether a range of policy options

are appropriate or not to be adopted by their government. The question allows us to find out whether and how a belief in territorial indivisibility influence policy positions, especially whether it leads to a higher likelihood of support for hardline policies.

Japan provides an excellent testing ground for our investigation. Currently Japan has three ongoing territorial disputes: Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute with China, Northern territories/Kurile islands dispute with Russia, and Takeshima/Dokdo islands dispute with South Korea. Therefore, the dispute scenarios that we present to the respondents are sufficiently realistic for them to form informed opinions. Moreover, some of the hypothetical scenarios match quite well with real world cases, which provide us with additional insights about public perceptions of and preferences for the resolution of the real disputes.

Our main findings are as follows. First, we find that historical ownership plays a significant role in the respondents' perceptions of territorial indivisibility compared with the alternative scenario of no such ownership. Moreover, the other two variables that are highly policy relevant for territorial disputes – the military strength of the opponent and the economic value of the territory – do not have a similar effect on the perceptions. Second, we find that those who perceive a territory to be indivisible are more likely to favor economic sanctions and military actions to a dispute, and much less likely to support bilateral negotiation. Third, at least in the Japanese context, IO arbitration receives an extremely high level of support regardless of whether the disputed territory is seen divisible or not. These findings are broadly consistent with our theoretical expectations and have significant policy implications.

These findings suggest that issue indivisibility may be another channel through which domestic politics plays a role in international conflict. Given the incentive for a government to misrepresent domestic preferences to gain bargaining leverage, there could be a tendency for outsiders to underestimate the salience of an issue to a domestic public. Such a miscalculation can lead to a breakdown in crisis bargaining through the mechanism of issue indivisibility. Our study thus cautions scholars and policy makers to pay closer attention to the factors contribute to domestic beliefs and preferences toward a disputed issue.

## 2. Territorial Indivisibility as a Belief: Its Source and Effect

In a sense, territorial disputes present a difficult case for an issue indivisibility argument: territories are physically divisible, even if one consists of a rock. What is seen as indivisible in such disputes, then? Typically a country claims that it has exclusive sovereignty over a disputed territory. So what is indivisible is a country's rightful ownership of a territory, rather than the territory itself; in addition, such claims almost always imply that sovereignty cannot be traded for something else. While it is possible that such claims are a bargaining strategy, given the persistence of the claims in many of the long lasting territorial disputes, we cannot rule out the possibility that they represent genuine beliefs. That is, the citizens of a nation may genuinely hold a belief in territorial indivisibility, the belief that their nation has exclusive sovereignty over a disputed territory, which can neither be shared nor exchanged for something else.

A natural question then arises as to why a belief in territorial indivisibility may arise for certain territories. A vast literature on territorial disputes have shown that those territories with intangible salience to a nation – due to historical, cultural, linguistic, religious and ethnic ties, are more likely to lead to severe conflict (Gibler, Hutchison, and Miller 2012, Goertz and Diehl 1992; Hensel 1999; Hensel et al. 2008; Herb and Kaplan 1999; and Newman 1999 Zellman, Shelef 2016). Unfortunately, the literature does not address the question of why territories with such characteristics are not amenable to bargaining solutions; they show only that those characteristics are highly correlated with conflict. Missing in the link between the characteristics of disputed territories and belligerent policy choices is actors' beliefs about what outcomes are acceptable, which may be *conditional* on the characteristics of a territorial. On the other hand, scholars who believe issue indivisibility is more important an explanation for conflict than what is suggested by bargaining theory have conjectured that territories with intangible values are more likely to be seen as indivisible (Hassner 2003; Hensel and Mitchell 2005, Toft 2006). In these studies the relationship between certain type of territories and actors' beliefs about their divisibility is assumed rather than established through empirical evidence; moreover, states or groups are seen as unitary actors who hold such beliefs.

Recognizing that it is actors beliefs rather than the innate characteristics of a territory makes the issue indivisible, and also the fact that beliefs are held by individuals rather than states or groups, we depart from the existing studies in two important ways in our investigation of the role of issue indivisibility in territorial disputes. First, we relax the unitary actor assumption in the canonical bargaining model and examine public attitudes toward territorial disputes. One may wonder if public opinion matters in foreign policy. Numerous studies have shown that territorial disputes are particularly sensitive to public sentiments and are more likely to escalate as a result (Gibler, Hutchison and Miller 2012; Roy 1997; and Vasquez 1993, 2009). The finding suggests that governments in general have a more difficult time to insulate their decisions on territorial disputes from publics. More specifically, we expect that public opinion matters in a democracy on salient foreign policy issues such as territorial disputes, but even in an authoritarian regime, such as China, where the survival of the government is the dominant policy concern, public opinion on territorial disputes is closely monitored by the government so that the government's legitimacy is not undermined by going against public opinion on such matters (Chyzh 2017, Weeks 2008, 2014; Weiss 2014). In addition, diplomacy is increasingly difficult to be conducted in secrecy (Kurizaki and Whang 2017), therefore, understanding public opinion on a territorial dispute is extremely valuable in assessing the constraints that a government faces and predicting its policy.<sup>1</sup>

Second, we investigate whether a belief in territorial indivisibility arises from one of the intangible factors identified by a vast literature on territorial disputes, namely historical ownership. We choose to examine the effect of historical ownership because it applies to the Japanese context most appropriately. In addition, historical ownership is in fact the most frequently invoked justification for territorial claims (Murphy 1990). We may question whether such claims are purely strategic: After all, historical accounts are subject to interpretations by different parties, and moreover, political actors can shape historical narratives rather than simply being constrained by them (Goddard 2006, 2010; Toft 2006). While this argument is persuasive, we also need to note that states do not use arbitrary claims to

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<sup>1</sup>A more direct reason that public opinion may matter is that policy makers may hold similar views as the public, or a particular segment of the public.

advance their territorial ambitions. Empirical evidence suggests that states typically have genuinely limited territorial claims, which may be derived from their (in)ability to control additional territories, a concern for weakening the national identity, and geographic considerations. “A strongly justified and politically salient claim for some territory could generate more support than a maximalist claims for the entirety of another state.” (Schultz and Goe-mans 2016). Historically ownership can provide a strong justification for a territorial claim as the ownership can form an important part of a nation’s, and in turn, an individual’s identity (Fang and Li 2016).

Of course, individuals can have different beliefs, and so we measure territorial indivisibility for each individual in our survey. That is, instead of assuming that a disputed territory is deemed to be indivisible or not by a nation, we allow citizens to have different beliefs over the matter. We then examine the effect of individuals’ beliefs on their policy preferences toward a dispute. Consequently, we test two main hypotheses. The first hypothesis investigates whether the frequently invoked argument of historical ownership contributes to a belief of territorial indivisibility for individuals:

**H1: Source of Indivisibility.** *Individuals are more likely to prefer indivisible outcomes in a territorial dispute if the territory is deemed to be historically owned by their country.*

The second hypothesis examines the effect of an individual’s belief in territorial indivisibility on her policy preference:

**H2: The Effect of Indivisibility on Policy Preference.** *Those who hold the belief that a disputed territory is indivisible are more likely to support contentious policy options than those who do not hold such a belief.*

### **3. Experimental Design**

To test the hypotheses, we designed a survey experiment embedded in a public opinion survey. Our survey was administered in September 2016 by Nikkei Research, an Internet marketing research firm in Japan. Through random assignments of different hypothetical dispute scenarios to respondents, our survey experiment allows us to assess the effect of

historical ownership on the respondents' perceptions of territorial indivisibility and their subsequent policy preferences. In this section we describe the experimental design while presenting the data and findings in the next section.

There are two modules in the survey. Module A asks respondents to answer two questions with regard to their attitudes toward hypothetical territorial disputes that Japan may face; Module B asks respondents to provide their socio-demographic information. In Module A, after a brief introduction, respondents read the following hypothetical scenario embedded with a randomized treatment that varies in the historical ownership of the territory. We also randomly varied two additional contextual features of the dispute: the military strength of the potential opponent in the dispute, and whether or not the territory has economic values (a  $3 \times 2 \times 2$  factorial design).

Please consider the following hypothetical scenario carefully and then answer the questions. When you read the scenario and answer questions, you do not need to think of a particular case.<sup>2</sup>

Japan is involved in a dispute with a [militarily strong/weak] neighboring country over a piece of territory (an island). This territory [has economic value/the economic value is unknown], and [historically belonged to Japan/historically belonged to the neighboring country/historically did not belong to any country].

With this design we are interested in whether the fact that a disputed territory is seen to be historically owned by Japan makes a difference in a respondent's perception of the (in)divisibility of the territory, and thus her preference for the outcome of the dispute *and* the policy toward the resolution of the dispute. The other two contextual variables – military strength of the neighbor and the economic value of the territory – tap into competing explanations for the preferences of respondents.

After reading the scenario, the respondents were asked two questions in sequence. The first question aims to test our first hypothesis regarding the effect of historical ownership

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<sup>2</sup>We added this statement because in the pretest some respondents said that they could not match hypothetical scenarios with Japan's real disputes.

as a source of a belief in territorial indivisibility, and the second question aims to test our second hypothesis regarding their policy preferences.

In the first question, respondents were presented with four possible outcomes of the dispute. They were then asked whether or not they found each outcome acceptable, unacceptable, or they were “unsure.” The four outcomes are:

1. Japan and the neighboring country share both the sovereignty of and the right to use the territory;
2. Japan enjoys the sovereignty of the territory, but both countries share the right to use the territory;
3. Japan enjoys the sovereignty of and the right to use the territory, but makes economic or political compensations to the neighboring country. Both countries reach an agreement on the terms of the compensation[, which will be monitored by international organizations (e.g. the UN, the International Court of Justice)/. (no monitoring mentioned)];
4. Japan enjoys the sovereignty of and the right to use the territory, and does not make any other concessions to the neighboring country.

The first two options are “divisible” outcomes. They are alternative arrangements of joint-ownership of the territory by separating sovereignty and the right to use and also allowing sharing of either. Such outcomes have been proposed in actual policies, and thus are sufficiently realistic for the respondents to form their opinions over the options. The third and fourth options represent “indivisible” outcomes where neither the sovereignty nor the right to use is shared. In the third, however, there is a bargaining solution nevertheless through side payments, while in the fourth, Japan makes no compromise at all. If historical ownership is a source of a belief in territorial indivisibility, then in general, we should see respondents receiving the ownership treatment more likely to find the “indivisible” outcomes acceptable and the other outcomes less so.

It is important to note that each respondent can choose more than one acceptable outcome because the design of the question allows one to choose all that are acceptable to her. Compared with a design in which a respondent chooses only her most preferred outcome,

our design has two advantages: It does not bias toward the indivisible outcomes – the more likely candidates for the most preferred outcome, and it provides us with much more information than the alternative design. In particular, our design allows us to learn the *threshold* outcome that is acceptable to a respondent, which forms the lower bound of a bargaining set. Then the upper bound of the set could naturally be an indivisible outcome that a respondent finds most preferable and thus will also choose as acceptable.

We added a twist to the third outcome, which is an indivisible outcome but allows for side-payments in order to reach a compromise solution. Specifically, for this outcome, half of the respondents were told additionally that the agreement will be monitored by international organizations such as the UN and the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The purpose of the treatment is to see if the existence of an international enforcement mechanism of the arrangement makes a difference in the preference over the outcome. The design will shed insight into the question of whether commitment problem is at the root of bargaining failure of indivisible issues (Powell 2006).

In the second question, respondents were presented with seven policy options with a statement that says that the Japanese government has adopted in the past, and may adopt in the future, these policies and measures to address real territorial disputes. The respondents were then asked whether or not they found each option (in)appropriate for the hypothetical dispute scenario that they were (randomly) assigned to, or they were “unsure.” The seven policy options are:

1. Strengthening externally-directed propaganda, guiding domestic public opinion, and encouraging the masses to display their dissatisfaction towards the disputing countries;
2. Imposing economic sanctions against relevant countries, canceling official visits, and reducing cooperative projects;
3. Reaching a compromise through bilateral negotiation;
4. Submitting [the dispute] to international organizations (e.g. the UN, the ICJ) for arbitration;
5. Shelving the dispute and jointly developing the resources;
6. Taking limited military actions;

## 7. Taking full military actions.<sup>3</sup>

The order of these options was randomized. Moreover, those who supported IO arbitration received a follow-up question, asking whether or not they thought that Japan should comply with the IO ruling *regardless* of what the IO decision is. Possible answers to this question are “yes,” “it depends on whether the decision is consistent with Japan’s interest,” and “unsure.” This additional question allows us to get at the respondents’ willingness to comply with an IO ruling on the dispute.

Taken as a whole, these questions gauge the respondents’ support for different policy positions that are realistically available to the Japanese government. Moreover, the policy positions include those cooperative ones that the government has taken in the past, and the respondents were *explicitly* reminded of this fact. Thus, the framing of the question is a hard test for finding the effect of issue indivisibility. Within the choices, we included “shelving the dispute,” perhaps the most well-known policy toward Senkaku/Diaoyu islands proposed by the Chinese government. We also included the option of submitting the dispute to an international organization, which has been advocated by the Japanese government but has been rejected by some of Japan’s neighbors. If issue indivisibility does lead to war, we expect that respondents who consider the territory to be indivisible are more likely to support policy options that are intransigent.

After completing the two questions, the survey asked respondents whether they envisioned an actual territorial dispute when they were answering the two questions. If the answer was “yes,” we asked them to specify the dispute, and whether the neighboring country has allies. If a respondent had allies in mind, then we asked her to specify the allies. We believe that these follow-up questions can shed additional insights into the considerations behind the respondents’ policy choices, and offer useful policy implications involving actual disputes.

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<sup>3</sup>The actual wording is “The Self-Defense Forces to perform any necessary military action, with the possibility of leading to war.”

## 4. Data and Findings

The survey was administered in September 2016 by Nikkei Research.<sup>4</sup> The respondents were randomly drawn from Nikkei Research’s online subject pool of over 145,000 panelists, who take surveys in exchange for the opportunity to win cash prizes. A total of 26,000 solicitations were sent to the subject pool, yielding a response rate of 10.08%, and thus a sample of 2,621 Japanese adults.<sup>5</sup> After reading the introduction, each respondent was given one of the hypothetical scenarios of a territorial dispute and the two questions as described above (Module A). At the end of the survey, they answered a battery of socio-demographic and attitudinal questions (Module B).<sup>6</sup>

In terms of the (self-reported) demographic characteristics, the average age of the respondents is 47, the male/female ratio is 52%/48%, and 56.85% have college degrees. Moreover, 26.9% of the respondents have annual income less than 3.5 million Yen, and 22.7% have over 8.3 million Yen; thus, the middle income group is 50.4%. Compared with the national average, the respondents in our sample are older, more highly educated, and slightly more tilted toward males. These features are similar to the online population in other countries, but also reflect Japan’s unique demographic composition, namely an older and more educated population.<sup>7</sup> In addition, 69.55% of the respondents work either full time or part time, and 25.52% support the LDP, the ruling party. In terms of the knowledge relevant for our study, 79.4% respondents answered that they are very or fairly interested in Japan’s foreign affairs.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>4</sup>The entire experiment lasted six days, and to the best of our knowledge, there was no major news event that could have influenced the respondents’ answers in a particular way.

<sup>5</sup>The sampling was implemented to match the national average in terms of geographical locations. The percentage of sample respondents drawn from the six regions in Japan (Hokkaido-Tohoku, Kanto-Koshinetsu, Chubu, Kinki, Chugoku-Shikoku and Kusu-Okinawa) are 11.75%, 36.59%, 14.96%, 16.71%, 8.74%, and 11.26%. The national average (in 2014) are 11.36%, 37.82%, 14.20%, 16.33%, 8.90%, and 11.39%.

<sup>6</sup>We include in the survey two attention check questions, asking respondents to select a specific choice. The vast majority of the respondents were paying attention; only 62 out of 2,621 failed both attention check questions. The results that we present in the paper are from the full sample.

<sup>7</sup>The average age in Japan is 40.14 (2014); the average level of education (2015) is junior/technical college and vocational school.

<sup>8</sup>Summary statistics of the sample can be found in the appendix.

#### 4.1 Historical Ownership and a Belief in Territorial Indivisibility

Figure 1 presents the results from the first question in the survey, which is the estimated effect of different scenarios of historical ownership on the respondents’ preferences over all possible dispute outcomes. Here we omit those people who said that they were “unsure” (about 20-25% of the respondents), but the results are similar when we combine the indecisive responses with the “unacceptable” ones.<sup>9</sup> The horizontal axis is the proportion of support for an outcome, and the vertical axis lists all possible outcomes of the dispute. Note that there are five outcomes (instead of four) in the figure because as we mentioned earlier, for the indivisible outcome with side-payments, half of the respondents were told that the agreement would be monitored by international organizations such as the UN and ICJ. In each row, the hollow squares or circles are the point estimates for the proportion of respondents who found the outcome acceptable, and the bars represent 95% confidence intervals.




Figure 1: *Average Level of Support for Different Outcomes Varying in Historical Ownership*  
 Figure shows proportion of respondents who support different potential outcomes of the dispute with 95% confidence intervals.

<sup>9</sup>See the appendix for more details.

We highlight several findings in Figure 1 by contrasting different scenarios of historical ownership. First, consistent with Hypothesis 1, historical ownership makes a difference in the respondents' preferences over the outcomes. In particular, Japan's historical ownership of the territory makes respondents much less likely to support sharing the sovereignty and the right to use the territory (25% vs. 42% or 45%), compared with the other two scenarios in which Japan does not have historical ownership, and the differences are statistically significant. Second, when Japan has historical ownership, respondents were more likely to prefer the most extreme indivisible outcome (Japan has both sovereignty and the right to use). Third, in each of the three scenarios, the existence of IO enforcement makes little difference in the respondents' preferences for the indivisible outcome with a side-payment. This suggests that whether or not there is a third party enforcement – the concern for credible commitment – does not matter.

Overall, the respondents care much more about the specific outcome of the dispute if Japan has historical ownership. In the scenarios that Japan does not have historical ownership, the support levels for different outcomes do not differ greatly, whether for the case of foreign historical ownership or the case of “owned by neither.” But in the case of Japanese historical ownership, there is a wider distribution of preferences.

Do other characteristics of the dispute affect respondents' preferences for the outcomes? In particular, does the cost of war – roughly captured by the military strength of the neighboring country – influence their responses? The answer is negative. We find that neither neighboring country's military strength nor economic value of the territory makes a difference in the respondents' preferences over the outcomes. In fact, the only finding that is worthy of note is that military strength influences the preference over the indivisible outcome in an unexpected direction.<sup>10</sup> In Figure 2, we see that respondents are *more* likely to support the most indivisible outcome if the neighboring country is militarily strong. In other words, the cost of war against a strong opponent does not deter the choice of the indivisible outcome. Beyond this finding, there is little difference between the responses under the two scenarios. IO enforcement, in particular, does not make a difference in the level of support for the side-payment outcome.

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<sup>10</sup>The results for the economic value are presented in the appendix.

Thus, we can conclude that the substantive effects are consistent with our first hypothesis: the existence of a historical ownership (but not the other contextual variables) increases the respondents’ beliefs in territorial indivisibility, and thus reduces their preference for outcomes that involve sharing sovereignty and the right to use, or compromises in the form of side-payments.<sup>11</sup>




Figure 2: *Average Level of Support for Different Outcomes Varying in Neighbor’s Military Strength* Figure shows proportion of respondents who support different potential outcomes of the dispute with 95% confidence interval.

## 4.2 Territorial Indivisibility and Policy Preference

We now turn to our second hypothesis and investigate whether a belief in territorial indivisibility affects respondents’ policy preferences toward the hypothetical dispute. To test

<sup>11</sup>One may wonder if the logic of prospect theory is at work here – that is, historical ownership puts a disputed territory in the domain of “loss” for those respondents who received the treatment, and thus prompted them to choose indivisible outcomes even if such outcomes imply more risky policy options, such as military actions. We do not believe this is the case, however. To see this, we can use “neither side has historical ownership” as the baseline (a realm of neither loss or gain) and see if the results from Japanese historical ownership and foreign historical ownership lead to different preferences over the outcomes. If prospect theory works in the realm of loss (Japanese historical ownership), then we also expect it to work in the realm of gain (foreign historical ownership). This means that the results from the two cases should lie in the opposite sides of the results from the baseline case. But this is not what we find in Figure 1 – no such pattern exists in the figure, suggesting that the results are not driven by respondents’ risk calculations.

the hypothesis, we constructed a measure of each respondent’s belief in the (degree of) indivisibility of the disputed territory based on the answers to our first survey question.

Specifically, we look for the individuals who find the *only* acceptable outcome to be the most extreme indivisible one – i.e., Japan has both sovereignty and the right to use the territory without offering side-payments to the neighboring country; that is, for all other outcomes, this group answers “unacceptable.” We code the group as “hardcore indivisible” respondents. The rest of the respondents are relegated to the second group, which we label as “compromise possible” – these individuals find either some sort of sharing of the territory or no sharing but paying side-payments to the neighboring country acceptable for resolving the dispute. The 232 respondents who were unsure about all of the outcomes are dropped. Out of the remaining 2,389 respondents, 381 belong to the “hardcore indivisible” group.<sup>12</sup>




Figure 3: *Proportion of Hardcore Indivisible by Treatment Group* Figure shows proportion of “hardcore indivisible” respondents with 95% confidence interval.

Before we turn to the test of our second hypothesis, we first present some analysis of the two groups. In Figure 3, we compare the proportion of “hardcore indivisible” respondents by

<sup>12</sup>We also constructed a measure based on the item response theory (IRT), which allows for a continuous measure of a respondent’s degree of belief in indivisibility. Results using the IRT measure, presented in the appendix, are substantively similar to the main findings using the binary measure that we present in the main text.

each of the contextual treatments. It is apparent that when primed with the treatment that the hypothetical territory under dispute is historically owned by Japan, a higher proportion of the respondents chose the indivisible without side-payments, i.e., the most uncompromising outcome, as the *only* acceptable outcome. The difference is statistically significant. In the meantime, military power of the neighbor and value of the territory once again do not lead to a change in preference for the most extreme outcome. The result lends additional support to our first hypothesis that historical ownership makes respondents more likely to perceive a territory to be indivisible, and thus more likely to prefer the most demanding indivisible outcome.

We also examined the difference between the two groups in terms of a number of sociodemographic and attitudinal variables. The sociodemographic variables include age, gender, education, employment, income, social status, interest in international affairs, and party affiliation;<sup>13</sup> the attitudinal variables include respondents' views on national defense and measures of their nationalism and conservatism.<sup>14</sup> We find that the "hardcore indivisible" respondents are younger, have lower perceived social status, are more interested in international affairs, more likely to view national defense as the top issue facing Japan, and are more nationalistic.<sup>15</sup> What is interesting is that the perception of territorial indivisibility is not correlated with ruling party affiliation. This suggests that policies regarding territorial disputes are unlikely to shift radically with change of government as long as public opinion on the matter constrains a government; territorial issues will be equally salient regardless of which party is in power.

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<sup>13</sup>Income is measured on a seven-point scale with 1 indicating less than 3.5 million Yen (approximately \$33,772) and 5 indicating more than 8.3 million Yen (\$80,089) in annual income. Social Status is respondents' self-perceived social group on a 10-point scale from poorest to richest. Interest in International Affairs is measured on a four-point scale from "very interested" to "not interested at all.". Party affiliation is based on a question asking respondents which political party they support. Respondents are divided into three groups: those that support the Liberal Democratic Party, the ruling party; those that support other parties; and those that do not support any particular party.

<sup>14</sup>National defense is measured as whether or not a respondent ranks national defense as the top issue facing Japan (as opposed to economic development, social stability, democracy, corruption, income inequality and environmental protection). Nationalism is a composite index based on their answers to the following five statements: "I am very proud to be Japanese," "I would rather be a Japanese citizen than a citizen of any other country," "Japan is the greatest country in the world," "I am proud of Japan's long history and culture," and "Japan should first take care of its self-interests, even if this means having conflict with other countries." Conservatism is measured on a 11-point scale based on a question asking respondents whether they are more conservative or progressive.

<sup>15</sup>These results are based on a logistic regression with perceived indivisibility as the dependent variable.

Now we use logistic regression to analyze the effect of perceived indivisibility of the disputed territory on a respondent's choice of policy to test our second hypothesis. We code indivisibility as a binary measure that equals 1 for the hardcore indivisible group, and 0 for the compromise possible group. There is a range of controls in the model, including the three contextual variables (historical ownership, economic value, neighbor's military strength) and a battery of sociodemographic variables mentioned earlier. The results are presented in Table 1.<sup>16</sup> If the coefficient for the variable "indivisible" is statistically significant for a policy option, then it shows that there is a difference in the policy preference between the "hardcore indivisible" group and the "compromise possible" group. We can see that, except for the policy option of IO arbitration, the differences in support for the remaining options are all statistically significant. Moreover, the respondents in the hardcore indivisible group are more likely to support belligerent policies, such as economic sanctions, limited as well as full military actions, but less likely to support bilateral negotiation and shelving the dispute (i.e., leaving the dispute for future resolution).

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<sup>16</sup>Using the IRT measure of indivisibility yields similar results, which are presented in the appendix.

Table 1: Support for Policy Positions Regarding the Disputed Territory

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Indivisibility	0.886** (0.144)	0.893** (0.143)	-1.733** (0.144)	-0.0378 (0.214)	-1.619** (0.193)	0.746** (0.142)	0.772** (0.143)
Historically Japanese	0.409** (0.127)	0.211 (0.134)	-0.385** (0.146)	0.375 (0.192)	-0.761** (0.134)	0.0948 (0.125)	-0.115 (0.139)
Historically Foreign	-0.346** (0.127)	-0.203 (0.137)	-0.0492 (0.149)	0.0838 (0.181)	-0.332* (0.129)	-0.400** (0.125)	-0.233 (0.140)
Nationalism	1.124** (0.200)	0.873** (0.214)	0.158 (0.219)	0.775** (0.264)	-0.284 (0.197)	1.140** (0.193)	1.132** (0.224)
Strong Neighbor	0.199 (0.103)	0.0625 (0.110)	0.00311 (0.119)	0.395** (0.153)	-0.0471 (0.107)	0.243* (0.101)	-0.0596 (0.113)
Valuable	0.227* (0.104)	0.0694 (0.110)	-0.207 (0.119)	0.0214 (0.152)	-0.0468 (0.108)	0.0533 (0.101)	0.0101 (0.114)
Age	2.22e-05 (0.00416)	-0.0262** (0.00440)	0.0156** (0.00477)	0.0238** (0.00607)	0.00835 (0.00428)	-0.0272** (0.00410)	-0.0276** (0.00456)
Male	0.491** (0.120)	0.632** (0.129)	-0.238 (0.137)	-0.113 (0.172)	0.0206 (0.124)	0.339** (0.117)	0.768** (0.135)
College Degree	-0.0633 (0.115)	-0.103 (0.123)	0.190 (0.133)	0.118 (0.170)	0.223 (0.119)	-0.107 (0.113)	-0.370** (0.127)
Full-time Job	0.00771 (0.126)	-0.0950 (0.132)	-0.210 (0.145)	-0.0182 (0.177)	0.0575 (0.130)	0.0859 (0.123)	0.238 (0.137)
Part-time Job	-0.0887 (0.164)	-0.118 (0.182)	-0.0922 (0.190)	0.471 (0.273)	0.119 (0.172)	0.0935 (0.161)	-0.252 (0.195)
Income	0.00895 (0.0406)	0.0295 (0.0426)	0.0705 (0.0462)	0.0614 (0.0580)	-0.0607 (0.0421)	0.0431 (0.0393)	-0.0316 (0.0446)
Social Status	-0.0759* (0.0342)	-0.124** (0.0355)	-0.00102 (0.0384)	-0.0831 (0.0487)	0.0993** (0.0348)	-0.0836* (0.0330)	-0.0533 (0.0364)
International Affairs	0.177* (0.0840)	0.0706 (0.0874)	0.199* (0.0922)	0.249* (0.117)	0.112 (0.0866)	0.128 (0.0824)	0.173 (0.0923)
National Defense	0.484** (0.110)	0.442** (0.115)	-0.364** (0.124)	-0.191 (0.161)	-0.495** (0.116)	0.571** (0.108)	0.643** (0.117)
LDP	0.123 (0.151)	0.270 (0.158)	-0.392* (0.175)	0.365 (0.218)	-0.364* (0.157)	0.563** (0.146)	0.250 (0.158)
No Political Party	-0.0294 (0.129)	0.0388 (0.140)	-0.255 (0.154)	0.334 (0.184)	-0.254 (0.131)	0.0364 (0.127)	-0.153 (0.146)
Conservatism	0.0670* (0.0280)	0.0720* (0.0295)	-0.0532 (0.0322)	-0.0401 (0.0409)	-0.0853** (0.0289)	0.0754** (0.0273)	0.0970** (0.0301)
Constant	-2.347** (0.386)	-1.036** (0.400)	0.930* (0.425)	-0.293 (0.543)	-0.0931 (0.402)	-0.858* (0.378)	-1.830** (0.416)
Observations	1,760	1,809	1,842	1,963	1,694	1,859	1,920
Pseudo R-squared	0.102	0.0966	0.118	0.0449	0.0982	0.115	0.132
LR $\chi^2$	246.5	214.1	239	58.38	220.3	295.7	292.2
Prob< $\chi^2$	0	0	0	3.74e-06	0	0	0

Dependent variables for models (1)-(7) are: (1)=publicity, (2)=economic sanction, (3)=bilateral negotiation, (4)=IO arbitration, (5)=shelving the dispute, (6)=limited military action and (7)=full military action. Standard errors in parentheses \*\*  $p < 0.01$  \* $p < 0.05$ .

There are also interesting statistically significant findings in Table 1 regarding the direct effect of historical ownership – the effect that does not work through indivisibility – compared with the baseline case of no such ownership by either country. Specifically, if the territory’s historical ownership belongs to Japan, then there is more support for publicity and less support for bilateral negotiation and shelving the dispute, which shows a somewhat hardline position; on the other hand, foreign historical ownership leads to less support for publicity, limited military actions, and shelving the dispute, which implies a generally “quiet” approach to the dispute. It is worth noting that in both cases the option of shelving the dispute has less support than if the territory is unclaimed, though Japanese ownership leads to even less support of the policy.




Figure 4: *Predicted Probability of Support for Each Policy Positions by Two Groups* Predicted Probabilities are calculated with the rest of the variables held at their median. The 95% confidence intervals are calculated using the delta method.

To further examine how a belief in territorial indivisibility affects respondents’ policy choices, Figure 4 juxtaposes the predicted probabilities of support for each policy for both the “hardcore indivisible” and “compromise possible” groups. For the compromise possible group, most notably, bilateral negotiation and IO arbitration both received extremely high

support. Generally speaking, for this group the level of support decreases as the policy options become more bellicose, with an 18% support for full military action at the bottom. Surprisingly, there is even less support for economic sanctions than limited military actions. Turning to the hardcore indivisible group, again IO arbitration ranks at the top, followed by limited military actions. The support for economic sanctions similarly falls behind limited military actions. Overall, the hardcore group favors more combative policies, which include economic sanctions, limited and full military actions. The differences between the percentages of support for the two groups are all statistically significant and the substantive differences are large. These findings provide strong support for our second hypothesis, which is that those who hold the belief that a disputed territory is indivisible are more likely to support contentious policy options than those who do not.

While many of these results are intuitive, three findings stand out and provide fresh insights. First, for both groups IO arbitration receives the most support and the level is similar at an extraordinarily high level of 89%. In contrast, in a similar survey in China (Fang and Li 2016), the support for IO arbitration was 62%. This suggests that the Japanese public has a much more favorable view about international arbitration as a method of conflict resolution than the Chinese public. Second, for both groups the support for economic sanctions fall between limited military actions and full military actions. It is highly likely that the respondents considered the costs of different actions and the costs of economic sanctions are seen as greater than those for limited military actions, but smaller than those for full military actions. Third, the difference between the levels of support for different policy options are very large between the two groups. For example, the hardcore indivisible group is 35%, 38%, and 39% more likely to support economic sanctions, limited military actions, and full military actions, respectively. In contrast, in our survey in China, the hardcore indivisible group is 14.3% and 15.5% more likely to support economic sanctions and military actions, respectively.<sup>17</sup> However, in China's case, the compromise possible group has higher levels of support for sanctions and military actions than those from its counterpart in this study. These findings suggest that the moderates in China are more hardline than those in Japan; in the meantime, the distance between the moderates and hardliners is larger in Japan than

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<sup>17</sup>In China survey we did not separate military actions into full and limited.

in China.

Now we turn to the effects of individual characteristics of the respondents on their support for each policy position, which are displayed in Table 1. First, unsurprisingly, nationalism plays a significant role in the policy choices. It increases the support for all combative policies, from economic sanctions to both limited and full military actions. However, it also increases the support for IO arbitration. This positive attitudes toward IO arbitration in association with nationalism is counterintuitive, but perhaps indicating a favorable view of IOs in general and/or an expectation that a ruling is going to be in Japan's interests. A further finding is that of the 89% who said IO arbitration was appropriate in resolving the dispute, 78% said "yes" to the statement "Japan should comply with the IO ruling *regardless* of what the decision is." For a comparison, 60% Chinese respondents in our earlier work answered that IO arbitration is appropriate, and among them only 30% agreed with the follow-up statement.

Second, older people and college graduates tend to be less supportive of conflictual policies such as economic sanctions and military actions. In contrast, males and those who believe national defense is the most important issue facing Japan today are more likely to support such measures. Finally, higher social status leads to less support for economic sanctions and IO arbitration. It is easy to understand why those who have higher social status are reluctant to endorse imposing economic sanctions on the neighboring country: such measures may hurt Japan's economy as well, which can negatively impact the self-interests of such individuals. However, it is less clear why the same individuals will oppose IO arbitration. A possible explanation is that IO arbitration is seen as provoking more frictions between the neighboring countries rather than resolving the dispute, which again creates tensions for the economy and their personal well-being.

### **4.3 Real vs. Hypothetical Disputes**

Recall that in the survey, respondents were told that they did not need to think of a particular territorial dispute when they read the hypothetical scenario. However, due to the high saliency of Japan's existing territorial disputes and their similarity with some of the

hypothetical scenarios, it is entirely possible that respondents were thinking about a particular dispute when they answered the questions. Indeed, we find that in our survey 1,410 out of the 2,621 respondents, that is, more than half of the respondents, said “yes” when we ask them at the end of Module A whether or not they have a particular real dispute in mind while answering the survey questions. We focus on this group of respondents in this section.<sup>18</sup>

For those respondents who say that they have a particular dispute in mind, we ask them to further elaborate in a follow-up question. Sifting through the 1,410 answers, we focus on the answers that touch on the three main territorial disputes that Japan has with China, Russia, and South Korea. To facilitate comparison, we remove those respondents who mention multiple disputes. In total, 423 respondents are thinking (only) about the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute with China; 207 are thinking (only) about the Northern territories/Kurile islands dispute with Russia; and 135 are thinking (only) about the Takeshima/Dokdo islands dispute with South Korea.

Using the same specification in Table 1, we re-analyze the effect of the indivisibility measure on policy preferences for the three groups of respondents. The resulting coefficient plots for each of the seven policy outcomes are reported in Figure 5. For brevity, we omitted the contextual variables and sociodemographic controls, but the full results can be found in the appendix. Similar to the results in Table 1, those who believe the disputed territory to be indivisible (who are in the hardcore indivisible group) are likely to pick bilateral negotiation regardless of which real dispute they have in mind. For the remaining policy options, however, the differences between the “hardcore indivisible” and “compromise possible” groups differ considerably depending on the disputes. In the case of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute with China, the “hardcore indivisible” group are less likely to opt for the option of shelving the dispute, but are indifferent with respect to the other options, including economic sanction and military action. For those thinking about the Northern territories/Kurile islands dispute with Russia, the “hardcore indivisible” group prefers to use publicity and economic sanction as a means of dispute resolution. In the case of South Korea, the re-

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<sup>18</sup>In the appendix, we report results obtained by focusing on respondents that do not have any real dispute in mind, which are nearly identical to the main findings reported in the previous section.

spondents in the hardcore indivisible group are more likely to support the three belligerent policy options, but less likely to support IO arbitration and shelving the dispute. These results suggest that respondents are likely taking into account the potential costs in evaluating the policy options, and are averse to resorting to military actions with Russia and China, the more powerful neighbors, and economic sanctions with China, Japan’s largest export market. This finding has important policy implications: it suggests that even for the hardcore believers in territorial indivisibility, their policy preferences are still influenced by other economic and military considerations.




Figure 5: *Coefficient Estimate of “hardcore indivisible” on Respondents’ Policy Preferences by Dispute Point* estimates with 95% confidence intervals for the “hardcore indivisible” variable are obtained from logistic regressions using the same specification in Table 1. Other variables are omitted for brevity.

## 5. Conclusion

Scholars of different persuasions have debated the importance of issue indivisibility as a cause of conflict. Bargaining theory of war argues that issue indivisibility is a symptom of some other underlying problems rather than a cause of war itself; moreover, even if an issue is indivisible, side payments or some allocation mechanism can still lead to a peaceful

bargaining solution (Fearon 1995). While theoretically elegant, these arguments stand in contrast to empirical observations of some of the most long lasting territorial disputes. The countries involved in these disputes have made the total sovereignty claims of the territories from the beginning of the disputes, and have never wavered from the position and settled for compromise solutions that will give them more than the status quo. These behaviors are puzzling from the perspective of bargaining theory. Therefore, we believe the relationship between issue indivisibility and territorial conflict begs further research.

Theories developed outside of the bargaining framework have been more open to the idea that issue indivisibility can lead to conflict, particularly in territorial disputes (Hassner 2003, Goddard 2006, 2010; Toft 2006); however, the point of debate for these studies is whether certain type of territorial issues are inherently indivisible or have constructed to be indivisible. In the meantime, a few observational studies support the hypotheses that cultural, historical, ethnic, or religious significance of a territory is more likely to lead to bargaining failure and war (Gibler, Hutchison, and Miller 2012; Hensel and Mitchell 2005). These studies have advanced our understanding of issue indivisibility in territorial disputes, however, none of them provide direct empirical investigation of how a belief in territorial indivisibility may arise, and how such a belief may influence policy choices.

We offer such an empirical analysis. The survey experimental approach that we employed allows us to trace the rise of a belief in territorial indivisibility due to historical ownership, most frequently invoked justification in territorial disputes. We then investigate whether such a belief leads to more hardline policy preferences toward the disputes. The survey results from Japan support our two main hypotheses, namely historical ownership does contribute to a belief in territorial indivisibility, and such a belief increases support for more contentious policies toward the resolution of territorial disputes.

There are additional findings that are of practical importance to policy makers. First, the Japanese public generally supports IO arbitration regardless of whether Japan has historical ownership of a disputed territory or not, and whether individuals perceive the territory to be indivisible or not. Second, they perceive economic sanctions as more costly than limited military actions but less so than full military actions. Third, there is a large distance in

the policy preferences between those who see a disputed territory to be indivisible and those that are willing to compromise; this difference is larger than what we found in China.

## Appendix

### A. The results for the contextual variables economic value




Figure 6: *Average Level of Support for Different Outcomes* Proportion of respondents who support different potential outcomes of the dispute with 95% confidence interval.

## B. Descriptive statistics of the sociodemographic data of the respondents

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics

	Obs	Mean	Median	SD	Min	Max
Indivisibility (Binary)	2389	0.16	0	0.37	0	1
Indivisibility (IRT)	2389	-0.01	0.02	0.79	-1.18	0.99
Proud to be Japanese	2621	0.81	1	0.39	0	1
I'd Rather be Japanese Citizen	2621	0.75	1	0.43	0	1
Japan is the Greatest Country	2621	0.48	0	0.5	0	1
Proud of Japanese History & Culture	2621	0.76	1	0.43	0	1
Japan Should Put Its Interest First	2621	0.29	0	0.45	0	1
Nationalism Index	2621	0.62	1	0.31	0	1
Age	2621	47.04	46	13.57	21	69
Gender (Male = 1)	2621	0.52	1	0.5	0	1
College Degree ( = 1)	2621	0.57	1	0.5	0	1
Fulltime Job ( = 1)	2621	0.46	0	0.5	0	1
Parttime Job ( = 1)	2621	0.15	0	0.36	0	1
Income	2611	2.9	3	1.52	1	5
Social Status	2621	4.82	5	1.83	0	10
Interest in Japan's Foreign Affairs	2621	2.97	3	0.75	1	4
National Defense Top Issue	2621	0.38	0	0.49	0	1
Liberal Democratic Party	2621	0.26	0	0.44	0	1
No Political Party	2621	0.49	0	0.50	0	1
Conservatism	2371	5.49	5	1.98	0	10

### C. Main results including the “unsure” responses




Figure 7: *Average Level of Support for Different Outcomes* Proportion of respondents who support different potential outcomes of the dispute with 95% confidence interval.




Figure 8: *Average Level of Support for Different Outcomes* Proportion of respondents who support different potential outcomes of the dispute with 95% confidence interval.




Figure 9: *Average Level of Support for Different Outcomes* Proportion of respondents who support different potential outcomes of the dispute with 95% confidence interval.

## D. Table 1 Using the IRT Measure of Indivisibility

Table 3: Support for Policy Positions Regarding the Disputed Territory

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Indivisibility	0.399** (0.0684)	0.435** (0.0714)	-1.279** (0.0906)	-0.477** (0.104)	-1.273** (0.0789)	0.415** (0.0663)	0.389** (0.0739)
Historically Japanese	0.370** (0.127)	0.200 (0.134)	-0.314* (0.149)	0.472* (0.194)	-0.644** (0.144)	0.0566 (0.126)	-0.118 (0.139)
Historically Foreign	-0.365** (0.128)	-0.211 (0.137)	0.00509 (0.153)	0.0976 (0.182)	-0.341* (0.140)	-0.416** (0.126)	-0.237 (0.140)
Nationalism	1.112** (0.199)	0.858** (0.213)	0.171 (0.223)	0.864** (0.264)	-0.140 (0.214)	1.121** (0.193)	1.133** (0.223)
Strong Neighbor	0.196 (0.103)	0.0575 (0.109)	0.00718 (0.121)	0.406** (0.154)	-0.0320 (0.116)	0.255* (0.102)	-0.0587 (0.113)
Valuable	0.222* (0.103)	0.0738 (0.110)	-0.233 (0.122)	0.00153 (0.153)	-0.0371 (0.116)	0.0522 (0.102)	0.00288 (0.113)
Age	0.000688 (0.00417)	-0.0253** (0.00441)	0.0135** (0.00493)	0.0228** (0.00613)	0.00547 (0.00459)	-0.0261** (0.00412)	-0.0269** (0.00457)
Male	0.525** (0.120)	0.655** (0.129)	-0.281* (0.139)	-0.113 (0.173)	-0.0663 (0.135)	0.366** (0.118)	0.797** (0.135)
College Degree	-0.0536 (0.115)	-0.0838 (0.123)	0.142 (0.136)	0.0756 (0.172)	0.112 (0.129)	-0.0799 (0.114)	-0.351** (0.127)
Full-time Job	0.0241 (0.126)	-0.0720 (0.132)	-0.264 (0.148)	-0.0153 (0.179)	0.0431 (0.139)	0.0968 (0.123)	0.241 (0.136)
Part-time Job	-0.0387 (0.164)	-0.0894 (0.182)	-0.198 (0.195)	0.464 (0.274)	0.0194 (0.185)	0.131 (0.161)	-0.219 (0.195)
Income	0.00910 (0.0405)	0.0283 (0.0427)	0.0789 (0.0474)	0.0676 (0.0585)	-0.0595 (0.0455)	0.0438 (0.0395)	-0.0237 (0.0447)
Social Status	-0.0683* (0.0343)	-0.123** (0.0355)	-0.0220 (0.0392)	-0.108* (0.0494)	0.0715 (0.0375)	-0.0765* (0.0331)	-0.0522 (0.0363)
International Affairs	0.233** (0.0838)	0.131 (0.0867)	0.0508 (0.0932)	0.228 (0.117)	-0.00221 (0.0935)	0.175* (0.0826)	0.229* (0.0920)
National Defense	0.500** (0.110)	0.466** (0.115)	-0.376** (0.127)	-0.116 (0.161)	-0.488** (0.125)	0.576** (0.108)	0.650** (0.117)
LDP	0.0981 (0.151)	0.248 (0.157)	-0.351* (0.178)	0.422 (0.220)	-0.304 (0.169)	0.526** (0.147)	0.222 (0.158)
No Political Party	-0.0144 (0.129)	0.0478 (0.140)	-0.305 (0.157)	0.336 (0.186)	-0.306* (0.142)	0.0369 (0.127)	-0.146 (0.146)
Conservatism	0.0650* (0.0280)	0.0700* (0.0295)	-0.0371 (0.0328)	-0.0305 (0.0411)	-0.0782* (0.0311)	0.0737** (0.0273)	0.0949** (0.0300)
Constant	-2.442** (0.386)	-1.140** (0.399)	1.384** (0.435)	-0.206 (0.546)	0.153 (0.431)	-0.966* (0.380)	-1.952** (0.416)
Observations	1,760	1,809	1,842	1,963	1,694	1,859	1,920
Pseudo R-squared	0.0999	0.0963	0.168	0.0619	0.194	0.120	0.132
LR $\chi^2$	241.9	213.3	340.2	80.53	435.7	307	291.8
Prob $<\chi^2$	0	0	0	6.93e-10	0	0	0

Dependent variables for models 1-7 are: publicity, economic sanction, bilateral negotiation, IO arbitration, shelving the dispute, limited military action and full military action. Standard errors in parentheses \*\*  $p < 0.01$  \* $p < 0.05$ .

## E. Policy Preferences for Respondents with No Real Dispute in Mind

Table 4: Support for Policy Positions Regarding the Disputed Territory

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Indivisibility	0.743** (0.227)	1.071** (0.229)	-1.710** (0.237)	0.409 (0.351)	-1.254** (0.263)	0.846** (0.224)	0.656** (0.229)
Historically Japanese	0.292 (0.201)	0.109 (0.214)	-0.574* (0.227)	0.0904 (0.265)	-0.713** (0.201)	0.0361 (0.196)	0.0471 (0.219)
Historically Foreign	-0.0739 (0.191)	-0.0333 (0.201)	-0.215 (0.220)	0.244 (0.257)	-0.549** (0.189)	-0.413* (0.183)	0.000986 (0.210)
Nationalism	1.077** (0.301)	0.357 (0.316)	0.224 (0.323)	0.902* (0.361)	0.0530 (0.285)	0.793** (0.285)	1.107** (0.328)
Strong Neighbor	0.123 (0.159)	0.0202 (0.169)	0.271 (0.181)	0.332 (0.215)	0.0155 (0.159)	0.303* (0.154)	-0.113 (0.173)
Valuable	0.127 (0.159)	-0.248 (0.171)	-0.301 (0.182)	0.0377 (0.214)	0.0907 (0.160)	-0.0964 (0.155)	-0.239 (0.174)
Age	0.00669 (0.00635)	-0.0145* (0.00661)	0.0142* (0.00716)	0.0184* (0.00866)	0.00494 (0.00622)	-0.0259** (0.00615)	-0.0226** (0.00687)
Male	0.590** (0.184)	0.481* (0.195)	-0.304 (0.206)	-0.247 (0.243)	0.0413 (0.184)	0.475** (0.178)	0.958** (0.207)
College Degree	-0.0893 (0.180)	0.0360 (0.193)	0.144 (0.200)	-0.0364 (0.251)	-0.0713 (0.181)	-0.188 (0.174)	-0.463* (0.196)
Full-time Job	0.215 (0.189)	-0.0819 (0.199)	-0.0831 (0.214)	-0.196 (0.247)	-0.0787 (0.186)	0.0886 (0.182)	0.255 (0.205)
Part-time Job	0.0198 (0.260)	-0.0213 (0.283)	-0.112 (0.290)	0.200 (0.387)	0.0232 (0.262)	0.317 (0.251)	-0.154 (0.298)
Income	-0.0425 (0.0624)	-0.00975 (0.0656)	0.0479 (0.0700)	0.0610 (0.0816)	-0.0312 (0.0619)	0.0482 (0.0596)	-0.0156 (0.0671)
Social Status	-0.0184 (0.0505)	-0.0722 (0.0532)	0.0237 (0.0567)	-0.0462 (0.0653)	0.0930 (0.0507)	-0.0830 (0.0492)	0.00158 (0.0538)
International Affairs	0.190 (0.126)	0.0960 (0.131)	0.245 (0.137)	0.0949 (0.158)	0.0848 (0.127)	0.106 (0.121)	-0.0325 (0.136)
National Defense	0.570** (0.168)	0.300 (0.176)	-0.253 (0.188)	-0.321 (0.226)	-0.342* (0.172)	0.655** (0.163)	0.838** (0.178)
LDP	0.0583 (0.229)	0.517* (0.239)	-0.846** (0.269)	0.386 (0.312)	-0.669** (0.232)	0.634** (0.224)	0.323 (0.240)
No Political Party	0.0651 (0.202)	-0.0554 (0.221)	-0.455 (0.245)	0.183 (0.258)	-0.699** (0.202)	0.259 (0.199)	0.0289 (0.226)
Conservatism	0.0729 (0.0407)	0.0417 (0.0429)	-0.0591 (0.0467)	0.000522 (0.0541)	-0.0663 (0.0412)	0.0661 (0.0395)	0.104* (0.0439)
Constant	-3.122** (0.594)	-1.284* (0.605)	1.035 (0.640)	0.210 (0.774)	0.340 (0.596)	-0.870 (0.564)	-2.056** (0.617)
Observations	765	803	823	868	738	817	853
Pseudo R-squared	0.0915	0.0773	0.113	0.0422	0.0773	0.109	0.129
LR $\chi^2$	94.25	72.75	101.4	27.18	77.58	122.3	123.9
Prob $<\chi^2$	0	1.54e-08	0	0.0757	2.26e-09	0	0

Dependent variables for models 1-7 are: publicity, economic sanction, bilateral negotiation, IO arbitration, shelving the dispute, limited military action and full military action. Standard errors in parentheses \*\*  $p < 0.01$  \* $p < 0.05$ .

## F. Policy Preferences for Respondents with Real Dispute Resolution in Mind

Table 5: Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute with China

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Indivisibility	0.0648 (0.330)	0.121 (0.366)	-1.656** (0.374)	-0.289 (0.526)	-1.642** (0.481)	0.490 (0.349)	0.660 (0.346)
Historically Japanese	0.195 (0.294)	0.305 (0.321)	-0.863* (0.371)	0.231 (0.543)	-0.833* (0.339)	0.416 (0.296)	0.00758 (0.341)
Historically Foreign	-0.792* (0.318)	-0.544 (0.359)	-0.198 (0.395)	-0.156 (0.527)	0.0851 (0.332)	-0.365 (0.304)	-0.411 (0.365)
Nationalism	1.552** (0.508)	1.090 (0.585)	0.356 (0.588)	0.150 (0.844)	-0.488 (0.528)	0.745 (0.483)	0.127 (0.567)
Age	-0.0158 (0.0106)	-0.0316** (0.0116)	0.0281* (0.0126)	0.0461** (0.0167)	0.0201 (0.0116)	-0.0232* (0.0104)	-0.0246* (0.0119)
Male	0.315 (0.293)	0.186 (0.324)	-0.514 (0.363)	0.137 (0.502)	-0.548 (0.318)	0.197 (0.281)	0.287 (0.343)
College Degree	-0.339 (0.274)	-0.411 (0.313)	0.581 (0.335)	0.376 (0.467)	0.513 (0.302)	-0.420 (0.274)	-0.364 (0.323)
Full-time Job	-0.00308 (0.322)	0.156 (0.352)	0.0303 (0.393)	0.397 (0.534)	0.663 (0.354)	0.201 (0.318)	0.517 (0.382)
Part-time Job	0.0484 (0.381)	0.110 (0.432)	0.349 (0.510)	1.067 (0.835)	0.554 (0.427)	-0.0679 (0.386)	-0.299 (0.523)
Income	0.101 (0.0998)	0.148 (0.110)	0.142 (0.119)	-0.0841 (0.171)	0.00391 (0.111)	0.0864 (0.0981)	0.0629 (0.117)
Social Status	-0.136 (0.0887)	-0.174 (0.0960)	0.0540 (0.105)	0.0378 (0.147)	-0.0375 (0.0961)	-0.0356 (0.0849)	-0.105 (0.0987)
International Affairs	0.231 (0.210)	0.0151 (0.233)	0.0278 (0.250)	-0.212 (0.359)	0.355 (0.230)	-0.0638 (0.208)	0.548* (0.250)
National Defense	0.399 (0.260)	0.526 (0.288)	-0.281 (0.322)	0.0377 (0.460)	-0.690* (0.296)	0.0772 (0.261)	0.180 (0.300)
LDP	0.464 (0.366)	0.234 (0.384)	0.186 (0.424)	0.243 (0.575)	-0.0665 (0.399)	0.661 (0.349)	0.458 (0.386)
No Political Party	0.141 (0.291)	-0.000286 (0.333)	-0.0867 (0.354)	0.649 (0.516)	-0.348 (0.314)	-0.0915 (0.282)	-0.576 (0.357)
Conservatism	0.0506 (0.0687)	0.120 (0.0755)	-0.0458 (0.0825)	-0.0125 (0.113)	-0.0711 (0.0711)	0.161* (0.0667)	0.119 (0.0779)
Constant	-1.300 (0.973)	-0.621 (1.084)	-0.155 (1.140)	0.142 (1.707)	-1.367 (1.107)	-0.368 (1.005)	-2.418* (1.145)
Observations	325	316	329	347	301	332	341
Pseudo R-squared	0.0998	0.106	0.153	0.0731	0.139	0.110	0.134
LR $\chi^2$	44.58	40.55	53.70	13.50	54.58	50.65	49.64
Prob $<\chi^2$	0.000161	0.000648	5.80e-06	0.636	4.16e-06	1.81e-05	2.61e-05

Dependent variables for models 1-7 are: publicity, economic sanction, bilateral negotiation, IO arbitration, shelving the dispute, limited military action and full military action. Standard errors in parentheses \*\*  $p < 0.01$  \* $p < 0.05$ .

Table 6: Northern territories/Kurile Islands Dispute with Russia

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Indivisibility	2.886** (0.790)	1.965* (0.881)	-2.131** (0.793)	1.601 (1.610)	-0.922 (0.768)	-0.190 (0.715)	-0.256 (0.906)
Historically Japanese	-0.0272 (0.520)	0.167 (0.567)	0.0172 (0.698)	2.946* (1.361)	-1.419** (0.529)	-0.592 (0.485)	0.187 (0.574)
Historically Foreign	-0.00235 (0.506)	-0.853 (0.603)	0.163 (0.703)	0.518 (0.950)	-0.178 (0.505)	-0.259 (0.471)	0.0250 (0.572)
Nationalism	2.318** (0.850)	1.017 (1.011)	1.790 (1.098)	1.519 (1.485)	-0.0738 (0.762)	1.494 (0.763)	1.987* (0.947)
Age	0.00279 (0.0172)	-0.0418 (0.0214)	0.0213 (0.0228)	0.121* (0.0478)	-0.0228 (0.0176)	-0.0372* (0.0165)	-0.0618** (0.0194)
Male	1.080* (0.475)	1.799** (0.623)	0.660 (0.608)	0.211 (0.955)	0.573 (0.473)	0.601 (0.435)	0.983 (0.530)
College Degree	0.668 (0.463)	1.321* (0.561)	0.488 (0.626)	0.635 (1.007)	1.196** (0.448)	-0.471 (0.443)	-0.458 (0.495)
Full-time Job	-0.657 (0.527)	-0.276 (0.620)	-0.289 (0.695)	-2.180* (1.095)	0.00393 (0.504)	-0.259 (0.469)	-0.204 (0.537)
Part-time Job	-0.649 (0.697)	-0.272 (0.911)	-0.738 (0.886)	-1.496 (1.450)	-0.321 (0.642)	-0.205 (0.622)	0.223 (0.718)
Income	0.308 (0.167)	-0.0280 (0.200)	-0.279 (0.225)	-0.0263 (0.348)	-0.0880 (0.167)	-0.00491 (0.159)	-0.168 (0.195)
Social Status	-0.114 (0.142)	-0.295 (0.168)	-0.0487 (0.199)	0.320 (0.287)	0.138 (0.138)	-0.169 (0.130)	0.0190 (0.152)
International Affairs	0.423 (0.354)	0.0500 (0.372)	-0.277 (0.455)	1.334* (0.598)	0.00676 (0.338)	0.822* (0.342)	0.830* (0.380)
National Defense	0.822 (0.455)	0.541 (0.542)	0.261 (0.614)	0.329 (1.015)	-1.038* (0.467)	0.127 (0.435)	0.0593 (0.503)
LDP	-0.636 (0.615)	-0.161 (0.737)	-0.573 (0.875)	0.758 (0.972)	-0.367 (0.659)	0.916 (0.595)	-0.0574 (0.716)
No Political Party	0.135 (0.520)	0.0836 (0.634)	0.421 (0.769)	3.207** (1.203)	0.298 (0.555)	0.102 (0.507)	0.349 (0.623)
Conservatism	0.225 (0.127)	0.276 (0.152)	-0.157 (0.188)	0.105 (0.247)	0.00421 (0.130)	-0.0186 (0.114)	0.144 (0.138)
Constant	-5.831** (1.741)	-2.016 (1.807)	2.274 (2.062)	-10.83** (3.323)	0.533 (1.537)	-1.191 (1.460)	-3.098 (1.658)
Observations	146	140	145	162	137	151	158
Pseudo R-squared	0.213	0.224	0.169	0.449	0.182	0.134	0.163
LR $\chi^2$	42.74	34.77	20.81	44.92	34.27	26.88	26.89
Prob< $\chi^2$	0.000306	0.00428	0.186	0.000143	0.00500	0.0429	0.0427

Dependent variables for models 1-7 are: publicity, economic sanction, bilateral negotiation, IO arbitration, shelving the dispute, limited military action and full military action. Standard errors in parentheses \*\*  $p < 0.01$  \* $p < 0.05$ .

Table 7: Takeshima/Dokdo Islands Dispute with South Korea

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Indivisibility	0.523 (0.675)	1.996** (0.773)	-3.116** (1.137)	-7.383 (6.147)	-3.748** (1.244)	1.378* (0.628)	1.211 (0.632)
Historically Japanese	1.958** (0.717)	0.992 (0.825)	-2.325 (1.463)	-2.331 (2.802)	-0.918 (0.830)	0.426 (0.671)	-0.478 (0.750)
Historically Foreign	-0.113 (0.674)	-1.949* (0.936)	-2.119 (1.520)	-2.182 (2.322)	-1.034 (0.805)	-0.660 (0.735)	-0.607 (0.791)
Nationalism	0.706 (1.176)	3.852* (1.717)	1.177 (1.882)	7.735 (5.314)	-1.056 (1.147)	1.553 (1.102)	1.146 (1.241)
Age	0.00790 (0.0224)	-0.110** (0.0354)	0.118** (0.0437)	-0.107 (0.0852)	0.0818* (0.0318)	-0.0564* (0.0238)	-0.0495 (0.0273)
Male	-0.227 (0.572)	1.303 (0.899)	0.378 (1.108)	4.089 (3.137)	-0.501 (0.683)	0.810 (0.653)	0.620 (0.663)
College Degree	0.593 (0.570)	0.000306 (0.701)	1.340 (0.954)	-5.983 (5.280)	0.0330 (0.644)	0.198 (0.566)	-0.987 (0.690)
Full-time Job	-0.186 (0.653)	-0.690 (0.888)	-1.638 (1.286)	4.583 (5.489)	-0.309 (0.733)	0.0641 (0.656)	1.198 (0.716)
Part-time Job	-1.094 (0.795)	-2.348 (1.207)	-0.480 (1.445)	0.200 (2.992)	-0.499 (0.911)	-0.889 (0.858)	-0.383 (1.077)
Income	0.0331 (0.190)	0.130 (0.233)	-0.348 (0.352)	-0.655 (0.651)	-0.368 (0.236)	-0.120 (0.201)	0.00815 (0.215)
Social Status	-0.258 (0.178)	-0.622* (0.261)	-0.554 (0.416)	-1.677 (1.832)	0.306 (0.211)	-0.119 (0.171)	-0.107 (0.190)
International Affairs	-0.211 (0.493)	1.171 (0.602)	-1.262 (0.798)	-0.230 (1.651)	-0.425 (0.571)	0.439 (0.466)	-0.0987 (0.495)
National Defense	0.369 (0.632)	0.708 (0.747)	-0.795 (0.996)	4.009 (3.888)	1.024 (0.767)	0.413 (0.612)	1.690* (0.674)
LDP	-1.030 (0.814)	-0.473 (0.854)	-3.738* (1.610)	5.188 (3.603)	-1.291 (1.009)	0.476 (0.718)	-0.0554 (0.772)
No Political Party	-0.478 (0.673)	1.231 (0.923)	-3.197 (1.721)	7.394 (5.429)	-0.0343 (0.783)	0.683 (0.731)	0.479 (0.745)
Conservatism	0.445** (0.167)	0.432* (0.200)	-0.638* (0.268)	-1.918 (1.573)	-0.181 (0.180)	0.0824 (0.149)	0.0717 (0.153)
Constant	-1.736 (2.130)	-2.429 (2.415)	12.94** (4.777)	29.00 (25.25)	-0.273 (2.475)	-0.825 (1.921)	-0.140 (2.137)
Observations	93	100	105	106	87	96	104
Pseudo R-squared	0.235	0.451	0.575	0.497	0.358	0.252	0.286
LR $\chi^2$	30.26	58.34	62	25.63	40.96	32.87	35.22
Prob< $\chi^2$	0.0167	9.96e-07	2.40e-07	0.0594	0.000564	0.00768	0.00370

Dependent variables for models 1-7 are: publicity, economic sanction, bilateral negotiation, IO arbitration, shelving the dispute, limited military action and full military action. Standard errors in parentheses \*\*  $p < 0.01$  \* $p < 0.05$ .

## E. Survey Questionnaire (English Translation)

### *Introduction*

We are conducting survey research on the opinions of Japanese citizens toward international political economic issues related to Japan. Your attitudes and opinions will be used for academic research only.

At the end of the survey, we will ask questions regarding your personal information, including age, gender, and education level. This survey is in strict accordance with relevant laws. We strictly adhere to the principle of confidentiality. We guarantee that we will keep your answers and your personal information confidential at all times and under all conditions. This questionnaire provides different types of options for different questions. Please select the option that best represents your choice. Thank you again for your participation and support.

### **Module A: Attitudes toward territorial disputes and foreign policy positions**

Please consider the following hypothetical scenario carefully and then answer the questions. When you read the scenario and answer questions, you do not need to think of a particular case.

Japan is involved in a dispute with a [militarily strong/weak] neighboring country over a piece of territory (an island). This territory [has economic value/the economic value is unknown], and [historically belonged to Japan/historically belonged to the neighboring country/historically did not belong to any country].

Do you find each outcome acceptable, unacceptable or are you unsure?

A1: Japan and the neighboring country share both the sovereignty of and the right to use the territory;

1. Acceptable
2. Unacceptable
3. Unsure

A2: Japan enjoys the sovereignty of the territory, but both countries share the right to use the territory;

1. Acceptable
2. Unacceptable
3. Unsure

[Respondents randomly get either A3a or A3b]

A3a: Japan enjoys the sovereignty of and the right to use the territory, but makes economic or political compensations to the neighboring country. Both countries reach an agreement on the terms of the compensation;

1. Acceptable

2. Unacceptable
3. Unsure

A3b: Japan enjoys the sovereignty of and the right to use the territory, but makes economic or political compensations to the neighboring country. Both countries reach an agreement on the terms of the compensation, which will be monitored by international organizations (e.g. the UN, the International Court of Justice);

1. Acceptable
2. Unacceptable
3. Unsure

A4: Japan enjoys the sovereignty of and the right to use the territory, and does not make any other concessions to the neighboring country.

1. Acceptable
2. Unacceptable
3. Unsure

The Japanese government has adopted in the past, and may adopt in the future, these policies and measures to address actual territorial disputes. Do you find each of the following option appropriate for the hypothetical dispute scenario, or are you unsure?

[The order of A5-A10 is randomized]

A5: Strengthening externally directed propaganda, guiding domestic public opinion, and encouraging the masses to display their dissatisfaction towards the disputing countries;

1. Appropriate
2. Not appropriate
3. Unsure

A6: Imposing economic sanctions against relevant countries, canceling official visits, and reducing cooperative projects;

1. Appropriate
2. Not appropriate
3. Unsure

A7a: Taking limited military actions by the SDF (Self Defense Forces) against the neighbor state to defend the territory;

1. Appropriate
2. Not appropriate
3. Unsure

A7b: Taking military actions by the SDF (Self Defense Forces) with a possibility of war with the neighbor state to defend the territory;

1. Appropriate
2. Not appropriate

3. Unsure

A8: Reaching a compromise through bilateral negotiation;

1. Appropriate
2. Not appropriate
3. Unsure

A9: Submitting [the dispute] to international organizations (e.g. the UN, the ICJ) for arbitration;

1. Appropriate
2. Not appropriate
3. Unsure

A9a Should Japan comply with the UN ruling regardless of the outcome?

1. Yes
2. It depends on whether the decision is consistent with Japans interest

A10: Shelving the dispute and jointly developing the resources.

1. Appropriate
2. Not appropriate
3. Unsure

A11: We asked you not to think of any specific country name when you start reading the scenario and answering questions. However, did you really not think of the neighboring country as a real country in the world?

- I did not think of any specific country name
- I actually thought of a specific country name

A12 Do you feel reliability to the US-Japan alliance treaty?

1. Feel reliable
2. Feel unreliable
3. Unsure

A13: What would you do if you were not satisfied with Japanese governments foreign policies?

[for respondents who choose I actually thought of a specific country name to A11]

A14: Which territorial dispute did you think of?

[for respondents who choose I actually thought of a specific country name for A11]

A15: Did you consider that this country might have support from an ally?

Yes  
No

A16: [for respondents who choose Yes for A15]:

Who is the ally?

## Module B: Socio-demographic Questions

B1: What year were you born?

B2: What's your nationality?

1. Japanese
2. Others

B3: What's your gender?

1. Male
2. Female

B4: Which prefecture do you currently live in?

B5: Do you live in the government-decreed metropolitan city?

1. Yes
2. No

B6: What's your highest level of education? If you are now enrolling, select the number where you are expected to finish.

1. Primary and Junior high school
2. Graduated from Senior high school
3. Graduated from Technical or Vocational school
4. Graduated from University (BA)
5. Graduated from Graduate School (MA)
6. Graduated from Graduate School (Ph.D)

B7: What is the nature of your work unit?

1. Full-time job (management and professional)
2. Full-time job (not management and professional)
3. Contract worker job
4. Temporary Job, part-time job
5. Self-employed
6. Student
7. Household
8. Unemployed
9. Do not want to answer

B8: Is your work related to the foreign trade business?

1. Very closely related to the foreign trade
2. Somehow related to the foreign trade

3. Not so closely related to the foreign trade
4. Not at all related to the foreign trade
5. Unsure

B9: What was your income last year? (Include crops, cotton, vegetables, and any other agricultural products you grow, secondary income from your labor, as well as salaries, bonuses, pensions, and all kinds of investment from your work outside the field.)

1. Less than 3,500,000 Yen
2. 3,500,000-4,800,000 Yen
3. 4,800,000 -6,300,000 Yen
4. 6,300,000 -8,300,000 Yen
5. More than 8,300,000 Yen

B10: People can be divided into different social groups based on their economic conditions. In the scale below, 0 represents the poorest group and 10 represents the richest group. Which group do you consider yourself to be in? Please select a number from the scale that best corresponds to your group.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

B11: Which political party do you support for?

1. Liberal Democratic Party
2. Democratic Party of Japan
3. New Komeito Party
4. Japan Communist Party
5. Japan Restoration Party
6. Social Democratic Party
7. Others
8. Do not support for a particular party
9. Do not want to answer

B12: On political issue, people can be divided into conservative and liberal. In the scale below, 0 represents the liberal group and 10 represents the conservative. Which group do you consider yourself to be in? Please select a number from the scale that best corresponds to your group.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

B13: Are you interested in Japans international affairs?

1. Very interested
2. Somewhat interested
3. Not very interested
4. Not interested at all

B14: Where do you get information on political and national issues? (choose all that applies)

1. Domestic news papers and magazines
2. Domestic TV
3. Domestic Internet (including online forums, chatrooms, blogs and social media)
4. Foreign news papers and magazines
5. Foreign TV
6. Foreign Internet (including online forums, chatrooms, blogs and social media)
7. None of above

B15: How important would you rate the following issues facing Japan today? (10 = very important, 0 = not important at all)

1. Economic growth and sustainable development  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

2. National defense and territorial disputes  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

3. Social stability  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

4. Political democracy  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

5. Corruption  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

6. Inequality  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

7. Environmental protection  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

B16: Finally, how much do you agree with the following statements?

B16-1: I am very proud to be Japanese

1. Strongly agree
2. Somewhat agree
3. Somewhat disagree
4. Strongly disagree
5. Its hard to say

B16-2: I would rather be a Japanese citizen than a citizen of any other country

1. Strongly agree
2. Somewhat agree
3. Somewhat disagree
4. Strongly disagree
5. Its hard to say

B16-3: Japan is the greatest country in the world

1. Strongly agree
2. Somewhat agree

3. Somewhat disagree
4. Strongly disagree
5. Its hard to say

B16-4: I am proud of Japan's long history and culture

1. Strongly agree
2. Somewhat agree
3. Somewhat disagree
4. Strongly disagree
5. Its hard to say

B16-5: Japan should first take care of its self-interests, even if this means having conflict with other countries

1. Strongly agree
2. Somewhat agree
3. Somewhat disagree
4. Strongly disagree
5. Its hard to say

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