

# The Strategic Use of International Institutions in Dispute Settlement

## The Online Appendix

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This document includes the following additional materials:

1. Proof that the main results do not change if a status quo is added to the model.
2. Proof that the main results hold when we assume a unilateral noncompliance reduces the size of the pie to a fraction  $a \in (0, 1)$ .
3. Graphic Illustration that the results hold when the institutional ruling is biased.
4. Two tables of contentious cases brought to the International Court of Justice (1946-2008) — one for all cases and the other for mixed dyads.

## 1. Proof that adding a status quo does not change the main results.

To restate the game, suppose that there is a status quo division of the disputed issue,  $(q, 1 - q)$ , where  $q$  is country 1's share and  $1 - q$  country 2's share. The countries can resolve the dispute by bilateral bargaining or appealing to an international institution. If an agreement is reached in a certain period, then the new division from the agreement will become the flow payoffs for the countries from that period on. If either country appeals to the institution in a period, then the countries play the institutional subgame. The payoffs in the simultaneous-move subgame are as follows (Table 1): If both countries comply with the institutional ruling, then the ruling,  $(s, 1 - s)$ , becomes the new division of the pie; if at least one country defies the ruling, then the status quo remains, with each defying country paying a noncompliance cost. The payoffs from the outcome of the subgame will become the new flow payoffs for the countries from that period on.<sup>1</sup>

Table 1: The Subgame after an Institutional Ruling  
Country 2

		Comply	Defy
		Comply	$s, 1 - s$
Country 1	Defy	$q - c_1, 1 - q$	$q - c_1, 1 - q - c_2$

To characterize the equilibrium, we need to consider four cases: (A)  $q > c_1$  and  $1 - q > c_2$ ; (B)  $q \leq c_1$ ,  $1 - q > c_2$ ; (C)  $q > c_1$  and  $1 - q \leq c_2$ ; (D)  $q \leq c_1$  and  $1 - q \leq c_2$ . Below I prove that the main results hold for the first case; the proofs for the other cases are similar.

Suppose  $q > c_1$  and  $1 - q > c_2$ . This is a case where the status quo payoffs are larger than the noncompliance costs for both countries. Then the unique NE of the subgame is as follows: If  $q - c_1 < s < q + c_2$ , then  $(C, C)$  is the NE; if  $s < q - c_1$  then  $(D, C)$  is the NE; if  $s > q + c_2$ , then  $(C, D)$  is the NE. The stage payoffs of country 1 and country 2 from appealing to the institution are:  $EU_1^I = \int_0^{q-c_1} (q - c_1)f(s)ds + \int_{q-c_1}^{q+c_2} sf(s)ds + \int_{q+c_2}^1 qf(s)ds$  and  $EU_2^I = \int_0^{q-c_1} (1 - q)f(s)ds + \int_{q-c_1}^{q+c_2} (1 - s)f(s)ds + \int_{q+c_2}^1 (1 - q - c_2)f(s)ds$ . From here we can derive four propositions that are similar to the propositions in the main text.

<sup>1</sup>In this setup, country  $i$  pays  $c_i$  in every period ever since it defies the ruling. This assumption is not essential, however. If a country pays the cost only once, then  $c_i$  can be transformed into a per period cost,  $c'_i$ , such that  $c_i = \frac{c'_i}{1-\delta}$ .

Suppose there exists a no-delay stationary SPE to the game. Let  $v_i^B$  denote country  $i$ 's best payoff if it makes a proposal given country  $j$ 's equilibrium strategy, and let  $v_i^I$  denote  $i$ 's payoff if it appeals to the institution, i.e.,  $v_i^I = \frac{1}{1-\delta}EU_i^I$ .<sup>2</sup> Then the equilibrium continuation value for country  $i$  is  $v_i = \max\{v_i^B, v_i^I\}$ . Assume that if a country is indifferent between making a proposal and appealing to the institution, it chooses to make a proposal; furthermore, if it is indifferent between accepting and rejecting a proposal, then it accepts.

**Proposition 1 (Bargaining EQ).** If and only if  $EU_1^I \leq q$  and  $EU_2^I \leq 1 - q$ , then the following is the unique no-delay stationary SPE:

- (a) Country 1 always proposes  $x_1 = q$  and always accepts a proposal if and only if  $x_2 \geq q$ .
- (b) Country 2 always proposes  $x_2 = q$ , and always accepts a proposal if and only if  $1 - x_1 \geq 1 - q$ .

In equilibrium, country 1's offer  $x_1 = q$  will be accepted immediately, and the status quo remains.

*Proof.* I first show that if a no-delay stationary bargaining equilibrium exists to this game, then it is unique. Suppose it exists. Then  $v_i = v_i^B$ . Because a proposal will be accepted immediately in such an equilibrium,  $\frac{1}{1-\delta} - v_1^B \geq (1 - q) + \delta v_2^B$  and  $\frac{1}{1-\delta} - v_2^B \geq q + \delta v_1^B$ . Optimality requires that the conditions hold with equality in equilibrium:

$$\begin{cases} v_1^B = \frac{1}{1-\delta} - (1 - q) - \delta v_2^B \\ v_2^B = \frac{1}{1-\delta} - q - \delta v_1^B, \end{cases}$$

The unique solution to the system of equations is:

$$\begin{cases} v_1^B = \frac{q}{1-\delta} \\ v_2^B = \frac{1-q}{1-\delta}. \end{cases}$$

Therefore, if a no-delay stationary bargaining equilibrium exists, then there is a unique equilibrium payoff for each country, which implies a unique equilibrium: In the equilibrium, country 1 always proposes a share  $x_1 = q$  to itself, and always accepts a share proposed by country 2 if and only if  $x_2 \geq q$ ; country 2 always proposes a share  $1 - x_2 = 1 - q$  to itself, and always accepts a share proposed by country 1 if and only if  $1 - x_1 \geq 1 - q$ . This is the equilibrium characterized in Proposition 1.

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<sup>2</sup>In this model, regardless of the institution's type, for some parameter range there always exists a unique NE in the subgame in which both countries comply with the institutional ruling. Therefore, it is not necessary to distinguish the institution's type for the propositions.

To prove necessity, suppose that there exists a unique no-delay bargaining equilibrium as characterized in Proposition 1. Because in the equilibrium both countries prefer bilateral bargaining to appealing to the institution, it must be the case that  $v_1^I \leq v_1^B$  and  $v_2^I \leq v_2^B$ , or equivalently,  $EU_1^I \leq q$  and  $EU_2^I \leq 1 - q$ .

To prove sufficiency, suppose  $EU_1^I \leq q$  and  $EU_2^I \leq 1 - q$ . I show that the strategies characterized in Proposition 1 form a SPE under the conditions. Suppose it is country 1's turn to make a proposal or appeal to the institution. First consider country 1's optimal proposal strategy given country 2's strategy. If country 1 proposes  $x_1 = q$ , then country 2 accepts and country 1's payoff is  $\frac{q}{1-\delta}$ . Clearly, country 1 cannot do better by offering 2 anything higher than  $1 - q$ , because it too will be accepted by country 2, and country 1 will be worse off. If country 1 offers anything less than  $1 - q$  to country 2, then it will be rejected. Given country 2's strategy, 1's payoff from this alternative strategy is less than or equal to  $q + \delta \frac{q}{1-\delta} = \frac{q}{1-\delta}$ . Therefore, proposing  $q$  is country 1's optimal proposal strategy. On the other hand, if country 1 appeals to the institution, then it gets  $\frac{1}{1-\delta} EU_1^I \leq \frac{q}{1-\delta}$ . So country 1 has no profitable deviation at this stage. Now consider country 1's acceptance strategy. It is optimal for country 1 to accept any offer of at least  $q$  and to reject anything less, because we have established that country 1's equilibrium payoff is  $\frac{q}{1-\delta}$ . By a symmetric argument, it follows that the strategy specified in Proposition 1 for country 2 is also its optimal strategy. The equilibrium outcome is that country 1 proposes a division that is the same as the status quo,  $(q, 1 - q)$ , and country 2 accepts immediately.  $\square$

**Proposition 2.** There is no equilibrium in which both countries prefer appealing to the institution to bilateral bargaining.

*Proof.* I prove by contradiction. Suppose both countries prefer appealing to the institution to bilateral bargaining. Then,

$$\begin{cases} v_1^B = \frac{1}{1-\delta} - (1 - q) - \delta v_2^I \\ v_2^B = \frac{1}{1-\delta} - q - \delta v_1^I, \end{cases}$$

And additionally,  $v_i^B < v_i^I$ . The condition combined with  $v_i^B$  from above implies  $v_1^I + v_2^I > \frac{1}{1-\delta}$ , or equivalently,  $EU_1^I + EU_2^I > 1$ , which is not possible. So the equilibrium of this type does not exist.  $\square$

**Proposition 3 (Institutional EQ1).** If and only if  $EU_1^I > q$ , then the following is the unique no-delay stationary SPE:

(a) Country 1 always appeals to the institution, and always accepts a proposal if and only if  $x_2 \geq (1 - \delta)q + \delta EU_1^I$ .

(b) Country 2 always proposes  $1 - x_2 = 1 - (1 - \delta)q - \delta EU_1^I$ , and always accepts a proposal if and only if  $1 - x_1 \geq 1 - (1 - \delta^2)q - \delta^2 EU_1^I$ .

In equilibrium, country 1 appeals to the institution in the first period.

*Proof.* I first show that if a no-delay stationary equilibrium in which country 1 appeals to the institution exists, then it is unique. Suppose it exists. Then  $v_1 = v_1^I = \frac{1}{1-\delta}EU_1^I$  and  $v_2 = v_2^B$ . Because country 2's proposal will be accepted immediately in the equilibrium,  $\frac{1}{1-\delta} - v_2^B \geq q + \delta v_1^I$ . Optimality requires that the condition hold with equality in equilibrium, that is,  $v_2^B = \frac{1}{1-\delta} - q - \delta v_1^I$ . Therefore, if the equilibrium exists, then there is a unique equilibrium payoff for each country, which implies a unique equilibrium: In the equilibrium, country 1 always appeals to the institution, and always accepts a proposal  $x_2$  if and only if  $\frac{x_2}{1-\delta} \geq q + \delta v_1^I$ ; country 2 always makes a proposal  $1 - x_2$  to itself such that  $\frac{1-x_2}{1-\delta} = v_2^B$ , and always accepts a proposal  $1 - x_1$  if and only if  $\frac{1-x_1}{1-\delta} \geq 1 - q + \delta v_2^B$ . This is the equilibrium characterized in Proposition 3.

To prove necessity, suppose that there exists a unique no-delay stationary institutional equilibrium as characterized in Proposition 3. Because in the equilibrium country 1 prefers appealing to the institution while country 2 prefers bilateral bargaining,  $v_1^B < v_1^I$  and  $v_2^B \geq v_2^I$ . Given the equilibrium strategies,  $v_1^B = (1 + \delta)q + \frac{\delta^2}{1-\delta}EU_1^I$  and  $v_2^B = \frac{1}{1-\delta} - q - \frac{\delta}{1-\delta}EU_1^I$ . Then for the equilibrium to exist, the condition  $EU_1^I > q$  must hold.

To prove sufficiency, suppose  $EU_1^I > q$ . I show that the strategies characterized in Proposition 3 form a SPE under the condition. Suppose it is country 1's turn to make a proposal or appeal to the institution. If country 1 appeals to the institution, then it receives  $\frac{1}{1-\delta}EU_1^I$ . Consider country 1's deviation to a proposal strategy. Given country 2's equilibrium strategy, the best payoff country 1 can receive from this alternative strategy is  $\max\{(1 + \delta)q + \frac{\delta^2}{1-\delta}EU_1^I, q + \frac{\delta}{1-\delta}EU_1^I\}$ . Given the condition  $EU_1^I > q$ , country 1 does not have an incentive to deviate to the alternative strategy. Now consider country 1's acceptance

strategy. It is optimal for country 1 to accept any offer of at least  $(1 - \delta)q + \delta EU_1^I$  and to reject anything less, because it brings country 1 a total payoff of  $q + \frac{\delta}{1-\delta} EU_1^I$ , which is the best that it can do by rejecting it. Next, consider country 2's possible deviations. Given country 1's strategy, country 2's proposal strategy is optimal. In addition, country 2 has no incentive to appeal to the institution at this stage because  $\frac{1}{1-\delta} EU_2^I < v_2^B = \frac{1}{1-\delta} - q - \frac{\delta}{1-\delta} EU_1^I$  given  $EU_1^I > q$ . It follows that country 2's acceptance strategy is also optimal. The equilibrium outcome is that country 1 appeals to the institution in the first period.  $\square$

**Proposition 4 (Institutional EQ 2).** If and only if  $EU_2^I > 1 - q$ , then the following is the unique no-delay stationary SPE:

(a) Country 1 always proposes  $x_1 = 1 - (1 - \delta)(1 - q) - \delta EU_2^I$ , and always accepts a proposal if and only if  $x_2 \geq 1 - (1 - \delta^2)(1 - q) - \delta^2 EU_2^I$ .

(b) Country 2 always appeals to the institution, and always accepts a proposal if and only if  $1 - x_1 \geq (1 - \delta)(1 - q) + \delta EU_2^I$ .

In equilibrium, country 2 accepts country 1's proposal immediately and the institution is never appealed to.

*Proof.* The proof for this case is symmetrical to that for Proposition 3, therefore it is omitted.  $\square$

In sum, the main results do not change. Note that the equilibrium I solved in these propositions is a unique no-delay stationary SPE. The results from the main model without a status quo are stronger — the equilibrium is a unique SPE.

**2. Proof that the results hold if a unilateral noncompliance reduces the size of the pie to a fraction  $a \in (0, 1)$ .**

The subgame in this case becomes:

		Country 2	
		Comply	Defy
Country 1	Comply	$s, 1 - s$	$0, a - c_2$
	Defy	$a - c_1, 0$	$-c_1, -c_2$

(a) Suppose  $1/2 < a < 1$ .

If  $c_1 + c_2 > 2a - 1$ , then we have the case of a high capacity institution similar to that in the original model. Specifically, if  $a - c_1 < s < 1 - a + c_2$ , then  $(C, C)$  is a unique NE; if  $1 \geq s > 1 - a + c_2$ , then  $(C, D)$  is a unique NE; if  $0 \leq s < a - c_1$ , then  $(D, C)$  is a unique NE. Then the expected utilities of country 1 and country 2 from appealing to the institution become:  $EU_1^{HC} = \int_0^{a-c_1} (a - c_1)f(s)ds + \int_{a-c_1}^{1-a+c_2} sf(s)ds$  and  $EU_2^{HC} = \int_{a-c_1}^{1-a+c_2} (1 - s)f(s)ds + \int_{1-a+c_2}^1 (a - c_2)f(s)ds$ . From here we can derive the same four propositions for the case of a high capacity institution as those in the main text. The same analysis applies to the low capacity institution (which I omit here).

So, if  $a$  is large enough as a fraction of the pie, then the same results as those in the original model follow. The only difference is that the threshold for high and low capacity institutions is  $2a - 1$  rather than 1. Because the threshold is lower, it is easier for an institution to acquire high capacity and bring about mutual compliance.

(b) Suppose  $0 < a \leq 1/2$

This is a case where the size of the pie shrinks significantly (by at least a half) when there is a unilateral defection from the institutional ruling. Because  $c_i \in (0, 1)$ , there is only one case for this parameter range — the case of high capacity institution ( $c_1 + c_2 > 0$ ). We can derive the same four propositions for high capacity institutions as before. This result means that if the size of the pie shrinks severely due to unilateral noncompliance, then any institution becomes powerful enough to bring about mutual compliance.

In sum, the main results hold if the size of the pie decreases when there is a unilateral noncompliance; moreover, institutions are capable of bringing about mutual compliance in

this case.

### 3. Illustrate that the results hold when the institutional ruling is biased.

In the paper I illustrate the intuitions of the equilibrium results using a uniform prior distribution of the institutional ruling. Below I illustrate the cases where one of the countries is believed to be favored by the institution.




Figure 1: A density distribution of the institutional ruling where country 1 is likely to receive a larger share.




Figure 2: A density distribution of the institutional ruling where country 2 is likely to receive a larger share.

(i) Consider an asymmetrical density distribution where country 1 is believed to be favored by the institutional ruling. That is, country 1 is more likely to receive a larger share of the pie from the institutional ruling. Let the density function be  $f(s) = 2s$  (Figure 1). The functional form is obviously chosen for simplicity, but the results should hold for distributions skewed in the same direction.

For the case of a high capacity institution, the expected utilities of the two countries are:

$$\begin{aligned} EU_1^{HC} &= \int_0^{1-c_1} (1-c_1)f(s)ds + \int_{1-c_1}^{c_2} sf(s)ds \\ &= 1/3 - c_1 + c_1^2 - 1/3 c_1^3 + 2/3 c_2^3, \end{aligned} \quad (1)$$

and

$$\begin{aligned} EU_2^{HC} &= \int_{1-c_1}^{c_2} (1-s)f(s)ds + \int_{c_2}^1 (1-c_2)f(s)ds \\ &= 1/3 c_2^3 + 2/3 + c_1^2 - 2/3 c_1^3 - c_2. \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

Using Equations 1 and 2, Figure 3 is drawn to illustrate the type of equilibrium emerges in different parameter ranges. First, similar to the case of a uniform prior distribution, the



bargaining equilibrium emerges when the two countries' noncompliance costs are similar. Second, country 1 now appeals to the institution for *all* levels of its noncompliance cost in equilibrium, but the behavior is conditional on country 2's noncompliance cost being high enough to prevent 2 from defying the institutional ruling. That is, country 1 has an incentive to increase its use of the institution if it is believed to be favored by the institution, but the incentive is moderated by a simultaneous increase in the risk that country 2 will defy the ruling.




Figure 3: *Equilibrium for a high capacity institution when the institution is likely to rule in favor of country 1.*




Figure 4: *Equilibrium for a low capacity institution when the institution is likely to rule in favor of country 1.*

We can do a similar analysis for the case of a low capacity institution and draw Figure 4. With a low capacity institution, because there is no equilibrium in the simultaneous subgame in which both countries comply, the fact that country 1 is favored does not benefit country 1; instead, because of the increased risk that country 2 will defect and left country 1 with a zero payoff, country 1 becomes more cautious in appealing to the institution compared with the uniform case, while country 2 is more emboldened.

(ii) Now consider an asymmetrical density distribution where country 2 is believed to be favored by the ruling. Let the density function be  $f(s) = -2s + 2$  (Figure 2).




Figure 5: *Equilibrium for a high capacity institution when the institution is likely to rule in favor of country 2.*




Figure 6: *Equilibrium for a low capacity institution when the institution is likely to rule in favor of country 2.*

Based on expected utility calculations similar to those in case (i), Figures 5 and 6 are drawn. First, for both high and low capacity institutions the result that we are more likely to observe the bargaining equilibrium when the noncompliance costs are similar for the two countries still holds. Second, for the case of high capacity institution, as in case (i), the ranges of  $c_1$  and  $c_2$  that produce the equilibrium in which country 1 appeals to the institution are determined by two factors: The fact that country 2 is likely to be favored by the institutional ruling, and an increase in the risk that country 1 will defy the ruling. For the case of low capacity institution, because there is no cooperative equilibrium, country 1 is not disadvantaged by a bias in favor of country 2 in the ruling; instead, country 1 is emboldened to appeal to the institution more often than the uniform case in the hope that it will end up in an equilibrium in which it defies while country 2 complies.

To summarize the findings with asymmetrical distributions of the institutional ruling, first, as in the case of a uniform distribution, we are more likely to observe the bargaining equilibrium when the two noncompliance costs are similar. Second, countries do not simply appeal more often to an institution that is likely to favor its position; they also consider that such a ruling brings a higher risk of defiance by the other side.

#### 4. Contentious Cases Brought to the International Court of Justice (1946-2008)

Table 2: All Contentious Cases: International Court of Justice (1947-2008)

No.	Date	Dispute	Applicant(s)	Respondent
1	1947 May	Corfu Channel	UK	Albania
2	1949 Sep	Fisheries	UK	Norway
3	1949 Oct	Protection of French Nationals and Protected Persons in Egypt	France	Egypt
4	1949 Oct	Asylum Case	Colombia/Peru	
5	1950 Oct	Rights of Nationals of the US in Morocco	France	US
6	1950 Nov	Asylum Case	Colombia/Peru	
7	1950 Dec	Haya de la Torre Case	Colombia/Peru	
8	1951 Apr	Ambatielos	Greece	UK
9	1951 May	Anglo-Iranian Oil Co.	UK	Iran
10	1951 Dec	Minquiers and Ecrehos	France/UK	
11	1951 Dec	Nottebohm	Liechtenstein	Guatemala
12	1953 May	Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943	Italy	France, UK,US
13	1953 Aug	Electricite de Beyrouth Company	France	Lebanon
14	1954 Mar	Treatment in Hungary of Aircraft and Crew of US	US	Hungary
15	1954 Mar	Treatment in Hungary of Aircraft and Crew of US	US	USSR
16	1955 Mar	Aerial Incident of 10 March 1953	US	Czechoslovakia
17	1955 May	Antarctica	UK	Argentina
18	1955 May	Antarctica	UK	Chile
19	1955 Jun	Aerial Incident of 7 October 1952	US	USSR
20	1955 Jul	Certain Norwegian Loans	France	Norway
21	1955 Dec	Right of Passage over Indian Territory	Portugal	India
22	1957 Oct	Guardianship of Infants	Netherlands	Sweden
23	1957 Oct	Interhandel	Switzerland	US
24	1957 Oct	Aerial Incident of 27 July 1955	Israel	Bulgaria
25	1957 Oct	Aerial Incident of 27 July 1955	US	Bulgaria
26	1957 Nov	Aerial Incident of 27 July 1955	UK	Bulgaria
27	1957 Nov	Sovereignty over Certain Frontier Land	Belgium/Netherlands	
28	1958 Jun	Arbitral Award Made by the King of Spain in 1906	Honduras	Nicaragua
29	1958 Aug	Aerial Incident of 4 September 1954	US	USSR
30	1958 Sep	Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company	Belgium	Spain
31	1959 Feb	Concerning Compagnie du Port de Beyrouth and Societe Radio-Orient	France	Lebanon
32	1959 Jul	Aerial Incident of 7 November 1954	US	USSR
33	1959 Oct	Temple of Preah Vihear	Cambodia	Thailand
34	1960 Nov	South West Africa	Ethiopia	South Africa
35	1960 Nov	South West Africa	Liberia	South Africa
36	1961 May	Northern Cameroons	Cameroon	UK
37	1962 Jun	Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company	Belgium	Spain
38	1967 Feb	North Sea Continental Shelf	FRG/Denmark	
39	1967 Feb	North Sea Continental Shelf	FRG/Netherlands	
40	1971 Aug	Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council	India	Pakistan
41	1972 Apr	Fisheries Jurisdiction	UK	Iceland
42	1972 Jun	Fisheries Jurisdiction	FRG	Iceland
43	1973 May	Nuclear Tests	Australia	France
44	1973 May	Nuclear Tests	New Zealand	France
45	1973 May	Trial of Pakistani Prisoners of War	Pakistan	India
46	1976 Aug	Aegean Sea Continental Shelf	Greece	Turkey
47	1978 Dec	Continental Shelf	Tunisia/Libya	
48	1979 Nov	United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran	US	Iran

*continued on the next page*

No.	Date	Dispute	Applicant(s)	Respondent
49	1981 Nov	Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary	Canada/US	
50	1982 Jul	Continental Shelf	Libya/Malta	
51	1983 Oct	Frontier Dispute	Burkina Faso/Mali	
52	1984 Apr	Military and Paramilitary Activities against Nicaragua	Nicaragua	US
53	1984 Jul	Concerning the Continental Shelf	Tunisia	Libya
54	1986 Jul	Border and Transborder Armed Actions	Nicaragua	Costa Rica
55	1986 Jul	Border and Transborder Armed Actions	Nicaragua	Honduras
56	1986 Dec	Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute	El Salvador/Honduras	
57	1987 Feb	Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELHC)	US	Italy
58	1988 Aug	Maritime Delimitation	Denmark	Norway
59	1989 May	Aerial Incident of 3 July 1988	Iran	US
60	1989 May	Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru	Nauru	Australia
61	1989 Aug	Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989	Guinea	Senegal
62	1990 Sep	Territorial Dispute	Libya/Chad	
63	1991 Feb	East Timor	Portugal	Australia
64	1991 Mar	Maritime Delimitation	Guinea	Senegal
65	1991 May	Passage through the Great Belt	Finland	Denmark
66	1991 Jul	Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions	Qatar	Bahrain
67	1992 Mar	Aerial Incident at Lockerbie	Libya	UK
68	1992 Mar	Aerial Incident at Lockerbie	Libya	US
69	1992 Nov	Oil Platforms	Iran	US
70	1993 Mar	Genocide	Bosnia&Herzegovina	Yugoslavia
71	1993 Jul	Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project	Hungary/Slovakia	
72	1994 Mar	Land and Maritime Boundary	Cameroon	Nigeria
73	1995 Mar	Fisheries Jurisdiction	Spain	Canada
74	1995 Aug	France's Nuclear Tests	New Zealand	France
75	1996 May	Kasikili/Sedudu Island	Botswana/Namibia	
76	1998 Apr	Vienna Convention on Consular Relations	Paraguay	US
77	1998 Oct	Land and Maritime Boundary	Nigeria	Cameroon
78	1998 Nov	Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan	Indonesia/Malaysia	
79	1998 Dec	Ahmadou Sadio Diallo	Guinea	Congo
80	1999 Mar	LaGrand	Germany	US
81	1999 Apr	Legality of Use of Force	Yugoslavia	Belgium
82	1999 Apr	Legality of Use of Force	Yugoslavia	Canada
83	1999 Apr	Legality of Use of Force	Yugoslavia	France
84	1999 Apr	Legality of Use of Force	Yugoslavia	Germany
85	1999 Apr	Legality of Use of Force	Yugoslavia	Italy
86	1999Apr	Legality of Use of Force	Yugoslavia	Netherlands
87	1999 Apr	Legality of Use of Force	Yugoslavia	Portugal
88	1999 Apr	Legality of Use of Force	Yugoslavia	Spain
89	1999 Apr	Legality of Use of Force	Yugoslavia	UK
90	1999 Apr	Legality of Use of Force	Yugoslavia	US
91	1999 Jun	Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo	Congo	Burundi
92	1999 Jun	Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo	Congo	Uganda
93	1999 Jun	Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo	Congo	Rwanda
94	1999 Jul	Genocide	Croatia	Yugoslavia
95	1999 Sep	Aerial Incident of 10 August 1999	Pakistan	India
96	1999 Dec	Territorial and Maritime Dispute in the Caribbean Sea	Nicaragua	Honduras
97	2000 Oct	Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000	Congo	Belgium
98	2001 Apr	Genocide Objections	Yugoslavia	Bosnia&Herzegovina
99	2001 May	Certain Property	Liechtenstein	Germany
100	2001 Dec	Territorial and Maritime Dispute	Nicaragua	Colombia
101	2002 May	Frontier Dispute	Benin/Niger	

*continued on the next page*

No.	Date	Dispute	Applicant(s)	Respondent
102	2002 May	Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo	Congo	Rwanda
103	2002 Sep	Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute	El Salvador	Honduras
104	2003 Jan	Avena and Other Mexican Nationals	Mexico	US
105	2003 Apr	Certain Criminal Proceedings in France	Congo	France
106	2003 Jul	Sovereignty over Pedra Branca	Malaysia/Singapore	
107	2004 Sep	Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea	Romania	Ukraine
108	2005 Sep	Dispute regarding Navigational and Related Rights	Costa Rica	Nicaragua
109	2006 Apr	The Host State of a Diplomatic Envoy to the UN	Dominica	Switzerland
110	2006 May	Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay	Argentina	Uruguay
111	2006 Aug	Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters	Djibouti	France
112	2008 Jan	Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters	Peru	Chile

Table 3: Cases of Mixed Dyads: International Court of Justice (1947-2008)

No.	Date	Dispute	Applicant(s)	Respondent
1	1947 May	Corfu Channel	UK	Albania
3	1949 Oct	Protection of French Nationals and Protected Persons in Egypt	France	Egypt
8	1951 Apr	Ambatielos	Greece	UK
9	1951 May	Anglo-Iranian Oil Co.	UK	Iran
11	1951 Dec	Nottebohm	Liechtenstein	Guatemala
13	1953 Aug	Electricite de Beyrouth Company	France	Lebanon
14	1954 Mar	Treatment in Hungary of Aircraft and Crew of US	US	Hungary
15	1954 Mar	Treatment in Hungary of Aircraft and Crew of US	US	USSR
16	1955 Mar	Aerial Incident of 10 March 1953	US	Czechoslovakia
17	1955 May	Antarctica	UK	Argentina
18	1955 May	Antarctica	UK	Chile
19	1955 Jun	Aerial Incident of 7 October 1952	US	USSR
24	1957 Oct	Aerial Incident of 27 July 1955	Israel	Bulgaria
25	1957 Oct	Aerial Incident of 27 July 1955	US	Bulgaria
26	1957 Nov	Aerial Incident of 27 July 1955	UK	Bulgaria
29	1958 Aug	Aerial Incident of 4 September 1954	US	USSR
30	1958 Sep	Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company	Belgium	Spain
31	1959 Feb	Concerning Compagnie du Port de Beyrouth and Societe Radio-Orient	France	Lebanon
32	1959 Jul	Aerial Incident of 7 November 1954	US	USSR
36	1961 May	Northern Cameroons	Cameroon	UK
37	1962 Jun	Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company	Belgium	Spain
40	1971 Aug	Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council	India	Pakistan
48	1979 Nov	United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran	US	Iran
52	1984 Apr	Military and Paramilitary Activities against Nicaragua	Nicaragua	US
54	1986 Jul	Border and Transborder Armed Actions	Nicaragua	Costa Rica
59	1989 May	Aerial Incident of 3 July 1988	Iran	US
60	1989 May	Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru	Nauru	Australia
67	1992 Mar	Aerial Incident at Lockerbie	Libya	UK
68	1992 Mar	Aerial Incident at Lockerbie	Libya	US
69	1992 Nov	Oil Platforms	Iran	US
76	1998 Apr	Vienna Convention on Consular Relations	Paraguay	US
81	1999 Apr	Legality of Use of Force	Yugoslavia	Belgium
82	1999 Apr	Legality of Use of Force	Yugoslavia	Canada
83	1999 Apr	Legality of Use of Force	Yugoslavia	France
84	1999 Apr	Legality of Use of Force	Yugoslavia	Germany
85	1999 Apr	Legality of Use of Force	Yugoslavia	Italy
86	1999 Apr	Legality of Use of Force	Yugoslavia	Netherlands
87	1999 Apr	Legality of Use of Force	Yugoslavia	Portugal
88	1999 Apr	Legality of Use of Force	Yugoslavia	Spain
89	1999 Apr	Legality of Use of Force	Yugoslavia	UK
90	1999 Apr	Legality of Use of Force	Yugoslavia	US
95	1999 Sep	Aerial Incident of 10 August 1999	Pakistan	India
97	2000 Oct	Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000	Congo	Belgium
98	2001 Apr	Genocide Objections	Yugoslavia	Bosnia&Herzegovina
105	2003 Apr	Certain Criminal Proceedings in France	Congo	France
107	2004 Sep	Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea	Romania	Ukraine
111	2006 Aug	Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters	Djibouti	France